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针对循环掩码型AES密码芯片,提出了一种相关性功耗攻击方法.首先利用方差分析找出明文盲化和S盒计算的时间点,然后通过比较盲化后的字节的汉明权重和实际测量功耗值的相关系数恢复掩码,最后针对S盒输入和输出的汉明距离进行相关能量分析.随机选取公开数据集DPA Contest V4提供的1×104条样本曲线进行实验,结果表明该方法仅需要45条曲线即可正确恢复密钥.
Aiming at round-mask AES cryptographic chips, a correlation power attack method is proposed.At first, variance analysis is used to find out the time points of the plaintext blind and S-box computation, and then the Hamming weights of the blind bytes are compared And the correlation coefficient recovery mask of the actual measured power consumption value, and finally the energy analysis of the Hamming distance of input and output of the S-box was carried out.Experimental results were obtained by randomly selecting 1 × 104 sample curves provided by public data set DPA Contest V4 This method requires only 45 curves to correctly recover the key.