论文部分内容阅读
盈余管理一直是国内外学者研究的热点,而高管人员的激励问题又是公司治理的核心问题之一。高管可能利用手中权力自定薪酬,从而使其通过盈余管理的手段谋取高额报酬的动机减弱。本文基于最优契约理论和高管权力理论研究我国上市公司高管薪酬与盈余管理之间关系,以及高管权力对两者关系的影响。
Earnings management has always been a hot spot for scholars both at home and abroad, and the motivation of senior executives is one of the core issues of corporate governance. Executives may use their own power to make their own payoffs, diminishing their incentives to earn high returns through earnings management. Based on the optimal contract theory and executive power theory, this paper studies the relationship between executive pay and earnings management of listed companies in China and the impact of executive power on the relationship between the two.