传统意义上的委托代理问题是由企业所有权和经营权相分离,股东享有剩余索取权而引发的。这种委托代理问题可以通过建立激励约束机制加以解决。随着现代企业的发展,另一种委托代理问题日益凸显,即大股东与中小股东之间的代理问题。大股东常常会利用信息、控制权等方面的天然优势,以损 The problem of principal-agent in the traditional sense is caused by the separation of ownership and management of the enterprise and the residual claims of the shareholders. This kind of principal-agent problem can be solved by establishing incentive and restraint mechanism. With the development of modern enterprises, the issue of the other types of principal-agent agencies has become increasingly prominent, that is, the agency problem between major shareholders and minority shareholders. Large shareholders often make use of the natural advantages of information, control, etc. to damage them