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梅洛-庞蒂在《知觉现象学》中借助斯特拉顿实验对客观空间进行了现象学还原,揭示出了一种内在于原初知觉经验的现象空间。无论是实在论的客观空间,还是观念论的客观空间,其结构都包含着绝对的确定性,因而它们都无法解释斯特拉顿实验中空间经验发生分解与重构的内禀动力学机制。这种动力学机制只有通过现象空间的概念才能获得阐明。现象空间起源于现象身体对于世界的原初把握,象征着形式与质料的原初综合。但是,现象空间的概念也面临着客观空间的现象学起源等有待解决的理论问题。
In the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty performed a phenomenological reduction of the objective space by means of Stratton’s experiment, revealing a phenomenal space inherent in the experience of primitive consciousness. Both the objective space of realism and the objective space of conceptualism contain absolute certainty. Therefore, neither of them can explain the intrinsic dynamic mechanism of the decomposition and reconstruction of space experience in Stratton’s experiment. This kinetic mechanism can only be clarified through the concept of phenomenal space. The phenomenal space originates from the fact that the phenomenal body grasps the original world and symbolizes the original synthesis of form and material. However, the concept of phenomenal space also faces the theoretical problems to be solved, such as the phenomenological origin of objective space.