本文运用演化博弈分析模型,研究如何克服经理人短期行为倾向,使企业长期利益最大化。研究结果表明博弈过程在3种情况下存在演化稳定策略,而不存在最优的稳定策略。通过设计合理的激励机制,使博弈向企业长期利益最大化、不监督的策略演化。 This article uses evolutionary game analysis model to study how to overcome short-term behavioral tendencies of managers so that the long-term interests of enterprises can be maximized. The results show that there are three evolution strategies in the game process, but there is no optimal strategy. By designing a reasonable incentive mechanism, the long-term interests of the game to the enterprise to maximize, non-supervised strategy evolution.