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工程质量体现着建筑承包商对业主和社会的信誉与责任,由于承包商掌握更多在建工程项目的相关信息,而业主和公众处于信息弱势的状态,信息的不对称可能导致承包商为追求自身利益而做出不利于业主的行为。因此,建立有效的激励机制是保障投资者经济利益和工程项目用户财产与生命安全的关键。基于委托-代理理论和博弈论,建立相关数学模型,分析比较了建筑承包商作为代理人,在与委托人签订契约的显性激励与市场声誉的隐性激励下的效用函数,得到有效激励实现的条件和提高激励效应的途径,指出声誉的隐性激励与契约的显性激励机制相结合作用的合理性与优越性,对如何有效地建立委托-代理关系下建筑承包商的激励机制提出对策建议。
The quality of the project embodies the credibility and responsibility of the construction contractor for the owners and the society. As the contractor has more information about the construction projects under construction, and the owners and the public are in a state of weak information, the information asymmetry may lead the contractors to pursue Self-interest is not conducive to the behavior of the owners. Therefore, to establish an effective incentive mechanism is to protect the economic interests of investors and project users, the key to property and life safety. Based on the principal-agent theory and game theory, the mathematical model is established, and the utility function under the implicit incentive of the contractor as the agent and the explicit incentive and the market reputation signed by the principal is analyzed and compared, and the effective incentive is achieved The author points out the rationality and superiority of combining the implicit incentive of reputation with the explicit incentive mechanism of contract and puts forward some countermeasures to how to effectively establish the incentive mechanism of the construction contractor under the relationship of principal-agent Suggest.