论文部分内容阅读
本文以2012-2014年219家中央企业(以下简称“央企”)上市公司共657个观测点为有效研究样本,手工收集监事会成员是否为党员的身份信息,采用面板数据混合回归模型研究央企监事会党组织治理与企业代理成本的关系,从组织文化的视角考察监事会党组织的治理效应。研究发现:监事会党组织治理有利于抑制第二类代理成本,但对于第一类代理成本并无显著的抑制作用;央企上市公司监事会自身对企业的代理成本(包括第一类和第二类)并无抑制作用,只有在党组织参与监事会的工作中,监事会才具有显著的监督作用,从而证明了党组织参与央企的公司治理具有显著的治理效应。研究结果为提高我国党组织治理水平、优化党企关系、优化监事会制度及提高监事会监督作用提供了参考。
This article takes a total of 657 observation points from 219 listed companies of central enterprises (hereinafter referred to as “central SOEs”) from 2012 to 2014 as valid research samples to manually collect whether the members of the board of supervisors are party members ’identity information. The panel data mixed regression model is used to study the central SOEs’ The Relationship between Supervisory Committee Organizational Governance and Corporate Agency Cost and the Governance Effect of Supervisory Board Organizational Organization from the Perspective of Organizational Culture. The study found that the governance of the supervisory board is conducive to the suppression of the second type of agency costs, but the first type of agency costs did not significantly inhibit the role of the board of supervisors of the central enterprises own agency costs (including the first and second category) And no inhibition. Only when the party organizations participate in the work of the board of supervisors, the board of supervisors plays a significant supervisory role, which proves that the corporate governance of the party organizations participating in the central enterprises has a significant governance effect. The results provide reference for improving the governance level of party organizations in our country, optimizing the relationship between the party and the state, optimizing the supervisory board system and enhancing the supervisory role of the supervisory board.