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基于Holmstrom and Milgrom(1991)的多任务代理理论,本文论证了在经济发展初期,加大对地方政府促进经济增长等容易度量指标的激励,以维持经济持续高速增长,并弱化对地方政府提供基本公共服务等不易考核指标的激励,是给定政治集权体制下中央政府的最优选择路径。但若持续地采取这种高能激励手段,经济增长将会和居民福利的提高渐行渐远,并将会对未来持续的经济增长造成损害。
Based on the theory of multitasking agents based on Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), this paper demonstrates that in the early stage of economic development, incentives such as local government to promote economic growth and other easy measures are encouraged to maintain sustained and rapid economic growth and weaken the provision of basic Public service and other indicators is not easy to assess incentives, given the centralization of government under the centralized system of the optimal choice path. However, if such high-energy incentives are continuously adopted, the economic growth will gradually go away from the improvement of residents’ welfare and will cause damage to the sustained economic growth in the future.