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本文以2010年银监会颁布的《商业银行稳健薪酬监管指引》为界点,对《指引》颁布前后高管薪酬是否存在粘性以及粘性强弱变化进行了实证分析。研究发现,我国银行高管薪酬存在粘性特征,而且在2010年指引颁布后高管薪酬的粘性程度较2010年前相比有所减弱。这说明有关稳健的薪酬制度、条规可以提高银行公司的薪酬业绩敏感度,改善银行公司治理水平。研究结论为我国出台进一步的薪酬管制政策,进而提高上市公司的治理水平提供了实证经验支持。
In this paper, the “Guidance Note on Robust Salary Regulation of Commercial Banks” promulgated by the CBRC in 2010 is taken as an excuse to analyze whether there is any stickiness in the executive compensation before and after the promulgation of the Guidance and whether there is any change in the cohesive strength. The study found that there is a sticky characteristic of executive compensation in China’s banks, and the stickiness of executive compensation has weakened compared with that before 2010 after the promulgation of the guidelines in 2010. This shows that the relevant pay system, the regulations can improve the sensitivity of the performance of the bank’s pay performance, improve the level of corporate governance of the bank. The conclusion of the study provides empirical experience support for the introduction of further salary control policies in our country and further improvement of the governance of listed companies.