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本文利用2007-2011年我国36个行业的非金融上市企业数据,研究了预算软约束对企业代理问题的影响。研究发现,企业的预算软约束将显著提高代理成本;预算软约束的存在还对债务融资与产品市场竞争的治理作用产生了影响。在加入预算软约束与企业资产负债率的交互项后,发现企业的债务治理效用的大小与预算软约束程度紧密相关;在将样本按是否存在预算软约束划分后,发现产品市场竞争的治理效用只存在于没有预算软约束的样本组中。
In this paper, we use the data of non-financial listed companies from 36 industries in China from 2007 to 2011 to study the impact of soft budget constraints on the agency problem of enterprises. The research finds that the soft budget constraint of the enterprise will significantly increase the agency cost. The existence of the soft budget constraint also affects the governance of debt financing and product market competition. After adding the interaction between budget soft constraint and enterprise asset-liability ratio, we found that the size of corporate debt governance utility is closely related to the degree of soft budget constraint. After the sample is divided by the existence of budget soft constraint, we find that the utility of corporate governance in market competition Only exist in the sample group without budget soft constraints.