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1934年底开始被中、日两国政府提倡 ,而在 1935年上半年盛行一时的中日“亲善外交”(或称“道义外交”) ,在当时即扑朔迷离。此后研究者大多对其持否定态度。本文从外交策略的角度 ,阐述了国民政府在“道义外交”实施前所面临的外交困境以及国民政府为改变中日外交状况而实施“道义外交”的策略思路 ;对日本外务部门和关东军对“道义外交”的不同回应也进行了分析 ;对国民政府由于“道义外交”开展而面临日本军部和外务省两方面压力的状况作了描述。指出 ,从外交策略上看 ,不能排除它是国民政府对日外交政策和策略的一种主动积极的调整 ,而不能将其完全视为本质性的卖国外交政策和策略。但是 ,它的实施和失败 ,既使国民政府的外交重新陷于了被动 ,也使国民政府的民族代表性遭到质疑。
At the end of 1934, it was advocated by the Chinese and Japanese governments. In the first half of 1935, the “goodwill diplomacy” (or “moral diplomacy”) between China and Japan, which prevailed in the first half of 1935, was confusing at the time. Since then, most researchers hold a negative attitude toward it. From the perspective of diplomatic strategy, this article elaborates the diplomatic plight that the Kuomingtang government faced before the implementation of “moral diplomacy” and the strategic idea of “moral diplomacy” implemented by the Kuomintang government to change the diplomatic situation between China and Japan; The different responses to “moral diplomacy” were also analyzed; the situation that the Kuomintang government faced pressure from both the Japanese military and the foreign ministry on the ground of “moral diplomacy” was described. He pointed out that from a diplomatic strategy point of view, it can not be ruled out that it is a proactive adjustment by the Kuomintang government toward foreign policies and tactics in Japan, and can not be regarded as an essential foreign trade policy and tactic. However, its implementation and failure have not only made the national government diplomacy again passive, but also challenged the national government’s national representation.