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WTO争端解决机制是世界贸易组织的制度框架中的一个亮点,从建立以来,该机制所处理过的案件数目庞大。WTO争端解决机构可以授权指控方对受控方中止履行相关义务,即报复性对抗措施。这种授权在实际上的实施效果和在制度上的合理性还倍受争议。本文拟对WTO争端解决机制中的报复性措施发表一点拙见,还望同行批评讨论。
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism is a bright spot in the institutional framework of the World Trade Organization. Since its establishment, the mechanism has handled a huge number of cases. WTO dispute settlement agencies may authorize the prosecution to suspend the controlled party to perform its obligations, namely, retaliatory countermeasures. The actual implementation effect and the institutional rationality of such authorization are also highly controversial. This article intends to make some humble comments on the retaliatory measures in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. It also expects peer criticism and discussion.