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现阶段我国碳交易试点已启动,形成碳配额交易价格机制的任务迫在眉睫。本文在考虑尤为复杂的碳市场风险体系的基础上,针对我国碳市场众多、有场无市、市场不成熟等特有现象提出了基于合作博弈理论的碳配额价格机制。本文首先运用网络层次分析法(ANP)来确定碳配额交易的风险值,综合考虑了影响碳市场的所有风险因子。然后应用班茨哈夫-克莱曼(B-C)权利指数来探讨交易伙伴的选择与交易量的瓜分,分散了交易风险。最后通过Shapley值和核仁法来探讨碳配额交易利益分配的合理性,保障了合作联盟的稳定性。此时,碳配额价格便可由利润公式求出。本文的研究结果表明,应用该三阶段博弈模型来模拟碳配额交易的价格形成机制可以有效地分散交易风险,能够很好地解决碳交易市场风险较一般市场大且复杂这一问题,是实现我国统一碳市场的重大推力。
At this stage, China’s carbon trading pilot has started, the task of forming a carbon quota trading price mechanism is imminent. Based on the particularly complicated carbon market risk system, this paper proposes a carbon quota price mechanism based on the cooperative game theory in view of the peculiar phenomena such as the large number of carbon markets in our country, market with no market and immature market. In this paper, we first use the network analytic hierarchy process (ANP) to determine the value of the carbon allowance transaction, considering all the risk factors that affect the carbon market. Then apply the B-C rights index to explore the separation of trading partner’s options and trading volume, which distorts the trading risk. Finally, through the Shapley value and the nucleolus method, the rationality of the distribution of carbon allowance transactions is discussed to ensure the stability of the cooperative alliance. At this point, the carbon quota price can be calculated by the profit formula. The research results of this paper show that using this three-stage game model to simulate the price formation mechanism of carbon allowance trading can effectively diversify the trading risk and can well solve the problem that the carbon market risk is larger and more complex than the average market, Unite the major thrust of the carbon market.