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理论研究表明集团向公司提供担保可以促进公司与金融中介形成优化债务契约,从而缓解公司的融资约束程度。本文以1999~2010年中国A股上市公司关联担保为研究对象,考察来自集团关联方的担保机制对公司融资约束的影响。控制了内生性问题的影响之后,结果表明集团关联担保可以显著降低上市公司担保当年的融资约束水平,同时还加强了公司的信贷能力,进而使公司在以后年度仍然保持较低的融资约束水平。使用双重差分方法的回归结果进一步验证了本文的发现,相对于没有接受过关联担保的公司,接受关联担保的公司在接受担保后融资约束显著降低。此外,本文的结果还表明接受关联担保还能够显著增加公司的投资水平和公司业绩。本文结果为集团化管理模式的优势提供了证据,同时有助于市场更加全面理解关联担保的经济后果。
Theoretical studies show that providing guarantees to corporations can promote the formation of an optimal debt contract between the company and financial intermediaries, thus alleviating the company’s financial constraints. This article takes the related guarantees of Chinese A-share listed companies from 1999 to 2010 as the research object, examines the impact of the guarantee mechanism from the related parties of the group on the financing constraints of the company. After controlling for the impact of endogenous problems, the results show that the group-affiliated guarantee can significantly reduce the level of financing constraints of the listed companies in the guarantee period, and at the same time strengthen the credit ability of the company, which will further keep the company’s financing constraint lower in the coming years. The regression results using the double-difference method further validate the findings of this paper. Compared with those companies that have not received the related guarantee, the companies accepting the related guarantee receive significantly less financial constraints after receiving the guarantee. In addition, the results of this paper also show that the acceptance of affiliated guarantees can also significantly increase the company’s investment level and company performance. The results of this paper provide evidence of the advantages of the group management model and help the market to understand more fully the economic consequences of the related guarantee.