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本文基于现有的关于交易成本的研究通常集中在以产权为核心的交换过程 ,而对宏观调控层面可能会引起交易成本的分析没有受到应有关注的事实 ,认为新制度分析包含着政策层面上的交易成本思想 ,政府的宏观调控会导致投资选择的交易成本。文章根据投资者在投资选择过程中是否承担以及在多大程度上承担由政策引致的交易成本 ,将投资者在某时期的最终定位划分为三大集群 ,在给出相应的基本平衡式的基础上 ,运用交易成本范畴对投资者的投资选择作出了一种间接博弈的解释。本文的分析在一定程度上说明了现实投资容易偏离宏观调控的原因。
Based on the existing research on transaction costs, this paper usually focuses on the exchange process with property rights as the core. However, the fact that the analysis of transaction costs may be caused by the macro-control level has not received due attention, this paper argues that the new institutional analysis includes the policy level The idea of transaction costs, the government’s macro-control will lead to the transaction cost of investment options. According to whether investors bear in the process of investment selection and to what extent the transaction cost is caused by the policy, the article divides the final positioning of investors in three periods into three clusters, and on the basis of giving the corresponding basic balance , The use of transaction costs to investors’ investment choices made an indirect game explanation. The analysis of this paper explains to some extent the reason why the real investment tends to deviate from the macro regulation and control.