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静态博弈分析说明:在没有政府或保险方监督的医疗服务市场,医疗服务的替代性越强,威胁越有效,医方的道德风险越小;否则,医方的道德风险较严重。声誉机制分析进一步说明:在一定的条件下,不规范的医院也会不诱导患者。据此,可以通过引入竞争机制、推进“医药分家”改革、倡导医患互动、强制信息披露和延长公立医院院长的任期等举措来治理医疗服务市场的道德风险。
Static game analysis shows that in the medical service market without government or insurance supervision, the stronger the substitution of medical services is, the more effective the threat is and the less the moral risk of the medical staff. Otherwise, the moral hazard of the medical staff is more serious. Reputation mechanism analysis further states: Under certain conditions, non-standard hospitals will not induce patients. Accordingly, the moral hazard of the medical service market can be controlled by introducing competition mechanisms, advancing the reform of medical division, advocating interaction between doctors and patients, enforcing information disclosure and extending the term of office of director of public hospital.