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委托代理理论强调代理成本的存在,强调公司高管有自我利益最大化的动机和能力。在我国愈演愈烈财务报表重述背景下,以2004到2013中国A股非金融类公司为样本,研究公司高管的自利行为。发现财务报表重述现象与高管自利有着显著正相关关系。为此,建议监管机构建立起上市公司财务报表重述的公司高管的管理责任追究机制,以及要求高管“吐回”已获薪酬激励的处罚政策。
Principal-agent theory emphasizes the existence of agency costs, emphasizing the motivation and ability of senior executives to maximize their own interests. Under the background of the repeated restatement of financial statements in our country, this paper takes China A-share non-financial corporations from 2004 to 2013 as a sample to study the self-interest behaviors of senior executives. Found that restatements of financial statements and self-serving executives have a significant positive correlation. To this end, it is recommended that regulators establish a management accountability mechanism for corporate executives that is recoded in the financial statements of listed companies as well as penalties that require executives to be “remunerated”.