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中央政府、地方政府及政府职能部门作为我国公共服务提供的三类基本行政主体,在纵向治理结构中呈现出不同的行为特征:中央政府在缺乏经济激励的背景下倾向于通过政治施压,形成以人事控制为依托,以会议动员、考核评比为主要手段的政治激励模式;地方政府在自主性、碎片化权威和能力约束等因素影响下,形成选择性政策执行模式;职能部门在部门利益和政绩压力驱动下,形成借上级压力实现权力扩张的行为模式。公共服务纵向治理模式的特点,决定了地方政府和政府部门具有足够的内在激励去扭曲政策目标,使得选择性执行成为基层政府的优势策略,导致公共政策难以落到实处。
As the three basic types of administrative bodies provided by China’s public service, the central government, local governments and government departments present different behavioral characteristics in the vertical governance structure. In the absence of economic incentives, the central government tends to adopt political pressure to form Local government, under the influence of autonomy, fragmented authority and capacity constraints, forms a selective policy implementation model based on personnel control, meeting mobilization, appraisal and evaluation as the main means; Driven by the pressure of political achievements, a pattern of behavior that takes the pressure of superiors to expand its power is formed. The characteristics of the vertical governance model of public services determine that local governments and government departments have enough internal incentives to distort the policy objectives and make selective implementation a dominant strategy of grass-roots government, which makes it difficult to implement public policies.