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文章基于一个双寡头古诺竞争模型,探讨了非生产性研发企业在技术授权与纵向兼并这两种技术传播途径之间的选择及其福利效应。研究发现:(1)如果技术创新程度较低,则研发企业的最优策略是技术授权,而如果技术创新程度较高,则最优策略是纵向兼并,这不同于Sandonis和Fauli-Oller(2006)的研究结论;(2)无论技术创新程度高低,从消费者剩余和社会福利角度看,研发企业的纵向兼并要优于技术授权。因此,政府应鼓励研发企业兼并生产企业,或者引导生产企业组建研发部门进行自主创新。
Based on a duopoly Cournot competition model, this paper discusses the choice and welfare effect of non-productive R & D firms in the transmission of technology and vertical mergers. The findings are as follows: (1) If the degree of technological innovation is low, then the optimal strategy of R & D firms is the technology authorization, and if the degree of technological innovation is high, the optimal strategy is vertical merger, which is different from that of Sandonis and Fauli-Oller ). (2) Regardless of the degree of technological innovation, from the point of view of consumer surplus and social welfare, the vertical mergers and acquisitions of R & D enterprises are superior to those of technology authorization. Therefore, the government should encourage R & D enterprises to merge with manufacturing enterprises or guide manufacturing enterprises to establish R & D departments for independent innovation.