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随着风电并网容量的增加,风电反调峰特性加剧,负荷低谷期的风力资源反而充裕,导致常规电源下调峰能力不足,风电受阻现象凸显,如何提高下调峰时期风电消纳能力,成为亟须研究的问题。首先,量化风电并网系统下调峰时期风电受阻现象;其次,在技术约束条件下考虑各参与主体的经济利益,构建高载能负荷消纳受阻风电的供应链,以风电场、输电商和高载能企业作为供应链的决策者,建立收益函数;最后,针对供应链竞争和合作两种状态,构建供应链非合作和合作博弈决策模型,并结合两者形成高载能负荷消纳受阻风电的供应链博弈决策方法。该方法基于技术约束下消纳的风电受阻电量,遵循经济收益博弈规律,制定出各主体经济收益达到均衡且多赢的供应链博弈决策,既能消纳受阻风电又能使供应链收益最大。算例分析验证了所述供应链博弈决策的可行性与有效性。
With the increase of capacity of wind power grid integration, the anti-peak characteristic of wind power is aggravated, while the wind resource at the trough of load is rather abundant. As a result, the peak power capacity of conventional power supply is insufficient and the phenomenon of wind power blockage is highlighted. Questions to be studied. Firstly, the wind power grid-tied system is quantified to prevent the wind power from being blocked during the peak season. Secondly, considering the economic interests of all the participating parties under the technical constraints, a supply chain with high load capacity to absorb the blocked wind power is constructed. The wind farms, As a decision-maker of the supply chain, the carrier-based enterprise establishes a revenue function. Finally, this paper builds a non-cooperative and cooperative game decision-making model for the supply chain competition and cooperation, and combines the two to form a high- Supply chain game decision-making method. This method is based on the obstructed electricity of wind power that is absorbed under technical constraints and follows the rules of economic returns and game rules to formulate a game of supply chain game in which all the main economic benefits are balanced and win-win. It can not only absorb obstructed wind power but also maximize the benefits of the supply chain. The case study verifies the feasibility and validity of the game decision of the supply chain.