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在理论分析企业实施管理层股权激励对公司治理中代理关系具有重大影响的基础上,以2008—2014年我国A股上市公司为样本,实证研究企业管理层股权激励对企业避税的影响。研究结果表明,管理层股权激励越大,企业实际有效税率越低,但考虑优惠税率的影响后,管理层股权激励与企业避税呈U型关系。结果证实,对管理者授予股权激励的确可以提高企业避税倾向,并协调其与所有者利益保持一致。
Based on the theoretical analysis of the significant influence of management equity incentive on the agency relationship in corporate governance, this paper uses the 2008-2014 A-share listed companies in our country as an example to study the impact of corporate management equity incentive on corporate tax avoidance. The results show that the greater the management equity incentives, the lower the effective tax rate, but considering the preferential tax rate, the management equity incentive and corporate tax avoidance are U-shaped relationship. The results confirm that the grant of equity incentive managers can indeed improve the tax avoidance tendency of enterprises and coordinate their interests with the owners.