论文部分内容阅读
本文研究了因改制上市模式不同所导致的控股股东掏空动机差异和控股股东持股比例及其交互作用对债务结构的影响。研究结果发现,相对于非存续分立公司,存续分立公司有息债务比例较高、债务期限较短,这种关系随着控股股东持股比例的增加而减弱;非存续分立公司控股股东持股比例与有息债务占总债务的比例和债务期限负相关,存续分立公司控股股东持股比例对有息债务占总债务的比例和债务期限没有显著影响。研究结果表明,公司债务结构决策未必是为了解决公司代理问题,也可能是公司代理问题的体现。
This paper studies the different motivations of controlling shareholders in tunneling and the shareholdings of controlling shareholders and their interaction effects on the debt structure due to the different modes of restructuring. The results show that, compared with the non-existence of discrete companies, there is a higher proportion of interest-bearing debt of surviving discrete companies and a shorter debt maturity, which decreases with the increase of the controlling shareholder’s shareholding ratio; Interest-bearing debt is negatively related to the ratio of total debt and debt maturity, and the proportion of interest held by the controlling shareholder of the surviving subsidiary does not significantly affect the ratio of interest-bearing debt to total debt and debt maturity. The results show that the company’s debt structure decision-making may not be to solve the company’s agency problem, it may be the embodiment of the company’s agency.