论文部分内容阅读
本文在Holmstrom和Milgrom(1987)委托代理理论模型的基础上,引入企业投资和管理者自信两个内生变量,研究管理过度自信对非效率投资的影响。研究表明,当企业过度投资时,适度自信的管理者会抑制企业的过度行为,过度自信的管理者会加剧企业过度行为;当企业投资不足时,适度自信的管理者会弥补企业的投资不足,过度自信的管理者会加剧投资不足。进一步研究发现,管理者适度自信会降低企业的代理成本,增加企业的价值;而管理者过度自信,会增加企业的代理成本,降低企业的价值。
Based on the principal-agent theory model of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), this paper introduces two endogenous variables of enterprise investment and managers’ self-confidence to study the impact of managing overconfidence on inefficient investment. The research shows that when the enterprise overinvests, the moderate and confident managers will restrain the excessive behavior of the enterprise, and the overconfident managers will exacerbate the excessive behavior of the enterprise. When the enterprise is under-invested, the modest and confident managers will make up for the under-investment of the enterprise, Overconfident managers can aggravate underinvestment. Further study found that managers moderately confident will reduce the agency costs and increase the value of the enterprise; and managers overconfidence, will increase the agency costs and reduce the value of the enterprise.