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中国上市公司管理报酬实践呈现效用不明的特点。为了引导报酬制度走向有效激励,需要从理论上深入认识管理报酬的本质,并整合我国现有法律制度资源。受信义务诉讼是规制管理报酬的最主要手段之一,法官既要避免直接对报酬数额做出评判,又要发展出适当的审判规则。我国证监会颁布了新规则,加大了薪酬披露力度,披露重点则应转向对报酬结构、细节和决策过程的披露。我国上市公司应重塑监事会的监督权,监督薪酬委员会制定报酬计划过程的独立性。我国的机构股东应更积极地参与到上市公司管理报酬的制定当中去。
The practice of management compensation in listed companies in China shows the characteristics of unclear utility. In order to guide the remuneration system toward effective encouragement, it is necessary to theoretically understand the essence of remuneration management and integrate the resources of the existing legal system in our country. Fiduciary litigation is one of the most important means of regulating the management of remuneration. Judges should not only avoid directly judging the amount of remuneration, but also develop appropriate trial rules. China Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated the new rules, increased the disclosure of remuneration, the disclosure should focus on remuneration structure, details and decision-making process of disclosure. China’s listed companies should reshape the supervisory power of the supervisory board and supervise the independence of the remuneration planning process of the remuneration committee. Institutional shareholders in our country should participate more actively in the formulation of management remuneration of listed companies.