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研究了在包含一个供应商和两个零售商的供应链中的广告博弈协调问题.将该问题构造为一个两层次的博弈:供应商与零售商之间的Stackelberg博弈以及零售商之间的合作博弈.供应商作为整个供应链上的主导者,拥有产品批发价和零售价的决策权,而零售商则通过在当地市场上的广告促销投入来影响需求,进而影响整个供应链的收益.研究发现,供应商可以通过简单地设定适当的批发价来影响零售商的广告促销投入,从而使得整个供应链实现最大收益.
The problem of game coordination in the supply chain including one supplier and two retailers is studied.The problem is structured as a two-level game: the Stackelberg game between suppliers and retailers and the cooperation between retailers Game. As the leader in the whole supply chain, the supplier has the decision-making power of wholesale price and retail price of the product, while the retailer influences the demand through the advertising promotion in the local market, thus affecting the profit of the whole supply chain. Found that suppliers can influence the retailer’s advertising spend by simply setting the appropriate wholesale price, maximizing the entire supply chain.