论文部分内容阅读
针对1个供应商和2个竞争零售商组成的分销供应链,研究了不同竞争强度下的联盟定价策略和稳定性.首先基于Stackelberg博弈模型给出了不同联盟结构下的定价策略;然后利用合作博弈理论中的Shapley值分配了联盟利润并探讨了大联盟的短视稳定性;最后运用最大一致集理论探讨了各种联盟结构的远视稳定性.结果表明,只有当竞争强度比较弱时,基于Shapley值分配利润的大联盟是短视稳定的;从远视的角度,供应链系统更可能出现的联盟结构为供应商一零售商联盟;当竞争激烈时,2个零售商的联盟也是远视稳定的.
Aiming at the distribution supply chain composed of one supplier and two competing retailers, this paper studies the alliance pricing strategy and the stability under different competition intensities.Firstly, based on the Stackelberg game model, the pricing strategies under different coalition structures are given. Then, The Shapley value in game theory allocates the profit of the alliance and discusses the short-sighted stability of the Major League. Finally, the maximal consistent set theory is used to explore the far-sighted stability of the various coalition structures. The results show that only when the competition intensity is weak, The big alliance of value distribution profits is short-sighted and stable. From the perspective of hyperopia, the alliance structure that the supply chain system is more likely to appear is the supplier-retailer alliance. When the competition is fierce, the alliance of the two retailers is also hyperopia stable.