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在2001年GE/Honeywell合并案发生时,人们曾热烈地讨论经济民族主义的作用。一些有影响的学者和评论人士强调了合并的国家控制与世界一体化之间的紧张状态。伴随着竞争法在世界范围内的传播,人们对民族主义应用于合并规制的担忧也增加了。本文分析了美国、欧盟以及日本的合并规制在多大程度上存在着趋同性,并通过分析审视了以经济民族主义(或“国家队”政策)为目的的自由裁量的合并规制在多大范围内仍然存在。首先,笔者比较了合并规制和作为经济民族主义工具之一的外国直接投资(FDI)控制,并指出即使在WTO体制下,合并规制仍然是贸易保护主义政策的有效手段。接着,笔者就几个具体问题研究了各国合并规制的趋同程度:1.市场支配力标准;2.市场界定;3.效率抗辩;4.纵向合并与混合合并。对于每一个问题,笔者都指明了民族主义适用的范围,同时也提出了改进的建议。
When the GE / Honeywell merger took place in 2001, the role of economic nationalism was heatedly discussed. Some influential scholars and commentators have emphasized the tension between the merger of state controls and world integration. With the spread of competition law worldwide, there has also been an increase in concerns about the application of nationalism to merger regulation. This article examines the extent to which the United States, the European Union, and Japan have converged regulation, and examines the extent to which the discretionary consolidation regulation for economic nationalism (or “national team” policy) is still valid exist. First of all, the author compares the merger regulation with the foreign direct investment (FDI) control which is one of the economic nationalism tools, and points out that the merger regulation is still an effective means of trade protectionism even under the WTO system. Then, the author studies the degree of convergence of the merger regulations of various countries on several specific issues: 1. The standard of market power; 2. The definition of the market; 3. The efficiency of defense; 4. Vertical mergers and mergers and mergers. For each question, I have specified the scope of nationalism, but also put forward suggestions for improvement.