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在建设工程项目中,业主可能会将自身低努力水平导致的超支成本转嫁给承包商,从而引发承包商事前道德风险和事后违约行为,降低项目效率。构建业主和承包商之间的博弈模型,设计最优成本超支风险分担率,抑制业主和承包商的道德风险,并探究契约和信任治理手段对抑制道德风险的不同作用机理。分析结果表明,在契约中引入最优风险分担率及违约金能够抑制双方道德风险和承包商违约行为。信任的协调作用能够提高承包商应对成本超支风险的效率,从而降低承包商的风险承担比率。因此,信任不仅能在一定程度上起到替代契约治理抑制业主和承包商道德风险的作用,而且能够增加双方的期望收益。
In construction projects, owners may pass overdraft costs caused by their low level of workability to the contractor, thereby triggering the contractor’s moral hazard in advance and subsequent default and reducing the project’s efficiency. Build a game model between the owner and the contractor, design the optimal cost over-risk risk sharing rate, restrain the moral hazard of the owner and the contractor, and explore the different mechanism of the contract and trust governance on the inhibition of moral hazard. The analysis results show that the introduction of the optimal risk sharing rate and liquidated damages in the contract can restrain moral hazard and contract breach of contract between both parties. The coordinating role of trust can increase the contractor’s efficiency in coping with the risk of cost overruns, thereby reducing the contractor’s risk-bearing ratio. Therefore, trust can not only play a role of substituting contractual control to restrain the moral hazard of owners and contractors to a certain extent, but also increase the expected return of both parties.