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本文主要基于基德兰德和普雷斯科特及其他人的后续研究,着重讨论了承诺对经济政策有效性的影响。本文指出,承诺通过稳定预期等有助于经济政策的有效制定和执行;但给定环境的不确定和参与人的有限理性,承诺是不完全的,这就出现了经济政策的时间不一致问题。但不完全承诺对经济本身的影响有利有弊,有效承诺应该包含一定的灵活性。保障有效承诺需要相应的制度安排,比如授权、声誉及宪政等。
This article is based primarily on follow-up research by Kidland and Prescott and others, focusing on the impact of commitments on the effectiveness of economic policy. This paper points out that promises to contribute to the effective formulation and implementation of economic policies through the stabilization of expectations, etc. However, due to the uncertainty of the given environment and the limited rationality of participants, the commitment is not complete, resulting in the time inconsistency of economic policies. However, there are pros and cons of not completely promising the impact on the economy itself, and effective promises should include some flexibility. Ensuring effective commitment requires appropriate institutional arrangements such as empowerment, reputation and constitutionalism.