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本文借鉴市场结构、资本监管与商业银行风险承担的模型进行分析。研究发现:(1)在市场集中度低的条件下,资本监管在减少银行风险承担行为上是有效的,但在市场集中度高的条件下,资本监管对银行风险承担行为的影响不明确;(2)通过选取2003～2008年中国大型商业银行的样本,计算市场集中度指标CR_5,并采用格兰杰因果关系检验,结果表明:中国银行业的市场结构为中集中度寡占型市场结构,且与资本充足率呈反方向变化,资本充足率的变化将影响中国银行业市场集中度的变化。因此,银监会的监管设计应结合中国银行业的市场结构。
This article draws lessons from the market structure, the capital regulation and the commercial bank risk assumption model carries on the analysis. The findings are as follows: (1) Under the condition of low market concentration, capital regulation is effective in reducing bank risk appetite. However, under the condition of high market concentration, the impact of capital regulation on bank risk appearing behavior is not clear. (2) By selecting the samples of China’s large commercial banks from 2003 to 2008, the market concentration index CR_5 is calculated and the Granger causality test is used. The results show that: the market structure of China’s banking industry is a moderately oligarchic market structure, And changes in the opposite direction with the capital adequacy ratio. Changes in the capital adequacy ratio will affect the changes in the concentration of the banking market in China. Therefore, the regulatory design of CBRC should incorporate the market structure of China’s banking industry.