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本文以长期股权投资和固定资产的投资组合选择为研究对象,从控制权私利的视角探讨了大股东自利性动机对资本配置决策的作用机理,并进行了相应的数值模拟。研究发现:(1)固定资产投资规模与长期股权投资高状态收益存在负相关关系,而长期股权投资规模则与其高状态收益概率正相关;(2)大股东自利性动机驱使下的资本配置决策偏离了分散持股时的资本配置水平,偏离程度会随着现金流权与控制权分离度的增加而展现出非线性变化态势。上述研究结论为当前有关加强上市公司大股东财务决策监管的政策导向提供了重要的经验启示。
In this paper, the long-term equity investment and fixed assets portfolio selection as the research object, from the perspective of private ownership of control discussed the major shareholders of self-interest motivation to capital allocation decision-making mechanism, and the corresponding numerical simulation. The results show that: (1) the scale of fixed assets investment is negatively correlated with the high-state returns of long-term equity investments, while the scale of long-term equity investments is positively correlated with the probability of high state returns; (2) Capital allocation driven by self-interest motivation of major shareholders The decision deviates from the level of capital allocation when the shareholding system is diversified. The degree of deviation will show a nonlinear trend of change as the degree of separation of cash flow rights and control rights increases. The conclusions of the above studies provide important experience and enlightenment for the current policy guidance on strengthening the supervision over financial decisions of large shareholders of listed companies.