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亚里士多德在《论灵魂》中提出了一个多层次的欲望概念,并在其道德哲学研究中对这个概念作出了进一步的发展。他区分了一般而论的欲望和具体的欲望形式,前者通常被认为是灵魂中与理性相对的部分,后者则根据其目标以及追求方式的不同而区分为欲求、冲动和想望。其中,想望作为一种特殊的欲望,本身便包含了对价值的敏感并且自然地与理性判断一致。本文试图指出,一般而论的欲望概念难以为人类行为的多重动机及其相互间的竞争关系给出恰当的说明,而一种经过区分的欲望概念则突破了理性与欲望对立的传统思路,不仅使我们对人性的复杂具有更加深入的认识,同时有助于我们更好地观察人类行为并对其作出恰当的道德评价。
Aristotle put forward a multi-level concept of desire in “On the Soul,” and further developed this concept in his moral philosophy research. He distinguishes between the general desire and the specific form of desire. The former is usually regarded as the part of the soul which is opposite to rationality, while the latter is divided into desire, impulse and expectation according to the goal and the way of pursuing. Among them, the desire as a special desire, itself, contains the value of sensitivity and natural and rational judgments. This paper tries to point out that the concept of desire in general can not give proper explanations for the multiple motives of human behavior and the mutual competition between them. However, the concept of a distinctive desire breaks through the traditional idea of antagonism between reason and desire. So that we can have a more in-depth understanding of the complexities of human nature and at the same time help us to better observe human behavior and make appropriate ethical evaluations on it.