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西季威克在《伦理学方法》的第一卷第九章中试图对“善”的含义做出说明,但他却先后提出了两种关于“善”的不同定义,而且没有对这两者的关系做出一个明确的说明,这给西季威克的研究者们造成了困扰。西季威克提出了关于“善”的自然主义定义和规范主义定义,它们的共同之处在于两者都是从欲望的角度来理解“善”的内涵,而区别则在于后者相较于前者还包含了一种由“应当”概念所标示的规范性要素。西季威克对“善”的定义实际上反映了现代道德哲学相比于古代道德哲学的一个新特点:“应当”成了一种独立于“善”的理性绝对命令。
Sidgwick attempted to explain the meaning of “good ” in the ninth volume of Volume I of the Ethics Methods, but he has proposed two different definitions of “good ” There is no clear explanation of the relationship between the two and this has plagued the researchers in the West quarter. Sidgwick proposed the definitions of naturalism and normativeism about “good ”, and their common denominator is that both of them understand the meaning of “good ” from the perspective of desire, Compared with the former, the author also contains a normative element marked by the concept of “should ”. Sidgwick’s definition of “good ” actually reflects a new feature of modern moral philosophy compared to ancient moral philosophy: “should ” become an absolute command of reason independent of “good ” .