论文部分内容阅读
土地流转成为我国农业现代化必由之路,土地流转带来了经营主体、土地规模和经营方式显著变化,从经营规模带来节水量处于盈亏平衡点上方、交易成本降低和外部性消失以及经营主体职业化与专业化这三方面对缺水地区农用水权置换产生积极影响。缺水地区由于水资源增量有限,第二、三产业发展只能借助农用水权置换。本文重点分析了缺水地区农用水权置换涉及置出方之间以及置出方与置入方之间两方面博弈,主要借助鲍弗瑞和罗森塞尔模型对农户间是否愿意配合农用水权置换项目进行分析,并通过鲁宾斯坦非合作博弈理论对置出方与置入方讨价还价能力进行博弈分析,最后根据前面分析,给出了相关政策建议。
The land transfer has become the only way of agricultural modernization in our country. The land circulation has brought the main body of business. The scale of land and the mode of operation have changed significantly. The amount of water saved brought by the scale of operation is above the breakeven point. The transaction costs are reduced and the externalities disappear. Specialization of these three aspects of water-deficit areas have a positive impact on the replacement of agricultural water rights. Due to the limited increment of water resources in water-scarce areas, the development of the secondary and tertiary industries can only be replaced by the rights of agricultural water. This paper focuses on two aspects of the game between the replacement parties and between the placement party and the reset party in the replacement of agricultural water rights in water-scarce areas. The right to replace the project analysis, and by Rubinstein non-cooperative game theory on the placement side and the bargaining power of the game analysis, and finally based on the preceding analysis, given the relevant policy recommendations.