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威廉斯与现象学传统之间存在着深层对话的可能性。这种对话的可能性一方面来自于威廉斯对“伦理生活的现象学”的定位,旨在解蔽我们对伦理实践的日常理解;而自海德格尔以降的现象学家们对此在生存的本质结构的描述也正致力于此。另一方面,在对方法主义的批判、道德行动者是什么样的人以及人之条件等问题上,他们都有着卓越的共识。但是,威廉斯温和的自然主义态度、对内/外二分模式的暧昧、对弱化了的相对主义的接受以及对实体的拒绝,都和现象学家们大相径庭,并最终表现为对自然科学的世界观如何影响了实践生活这一问题的不同态度。
There is a possibility of deep dialogue between Williams and the phenomenological tradition. On the one hand, the possibility of such dialogue comes from Williams’s position on “the phenomenology of ethical life,” aiming at dismantling our daily understanding of ethical practice. On the other hand, phenomenologists who descended from Heidegger The description of the essential structure of existence is also devoted to this. On the other hand, they all have excellent consensus on such issues as the critique of methodism, the kind of person who is the moral actor, and the conditions of people. However, Williams’s modest naturalist attitude toward ambivalence of dichotomies, the acceptance of weakened relativism, and the rejection of entities are very different from those of phenomenologists and eventually appear to be the world view of the natural sciences How to influence the different attitudes of practice life?