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本文在双向道德风险的模型下,从讨价还价的角度,研究了风险投资家和创业者之间的帕累托有效合约区间的确定问题。本文首先在给定条件下分析了帕累托有效合约区间的构造条件,并在此基础之上探讨了双方的努力效率和风险投资家的声誉动机对合约的帕累托有效区间的影响,以及投资额对帕累托有效合约的可行区间的影响,进而从理论角度解释了现实风险投资合约中存在的部分现象。
Under the model of two-way moral hazard, this paper studies the definition of effective Pareto interval between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs from the perspective of bargaining. This paper first analyzes the conditions of the Pareto effective contract interval under the given conditions and then explores the impact of both the efficiency of the venture and the reputational motivation of the venture capitalists on the Pareto effective interval of the contract, The influence of investment on the feasible interval of Pareto effective contract, and then explain some of the phenomena existing in the real-time venture capital contract theoretically.