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在公司内部治理机制难以解决代理问题的背景下,媒体的外部治理作用受到关注。利用中国上市公司的经验数据,实证检验微信媒体关注对代理问题的影响,从而发现:微信媒体关注可以显著降低上市公司的第一类和第二类代理成本,即抑制管理层不正常的在职消费和消极工作行为,大股东对上市公司的利益侵占问题;相对于报纸媒体,微信媒体对两类代理成本的降低作用更为显著。进一步研究证实,微信媒体能显著抑制国有上市公司的过度投资行为,以及缓解非国有上市公司的投资不足问题。微信媒体从外部治理的角度为保护中小投资者利益提供了新渠道。
In the context of the internal governance mechanism is difficult to solve the agency problem, the media’s external governance has drawn attention. Using the empirical data of listed companies in China, this paper empirically tests the impact of WeChat media attention on agency issues, and finds that: WeChat media attention can significantly reduce the first and second types of agency costs of listed companies, that is, inhibit the management of abnormal on-the-job consumption And negative working behaviors, the major shareholders’ problem of encroaching on the interests of listed companies. Compared with the newspaper media, WeChat media has a more significant reduction effect on the two types of agency costs. Further research confirms that WeChat Media can significantly inhibit overinvestment of state-owned listed companies and alleviate the underinvestment of non-state-owned listed companies. Micro channel media from the perspective of external governance to protect the interests of small investors provide a new channel.