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文章结合行为财务的研究成果,基于管理者视角探讨了信念波动在财政刺激与企业过度投资行为之间的中介效应,以及不同特征的企业对财政刺激资金效应与信号效应路径的选择性反应。研究发现,财政刺激政策的实施与退出造成了管理者信念和异质信念的波动,较强的管理者信念和异质信念均加剧了企业的过度投资行为;管理者信念在财政刺激与企业过度投资行为之间存在中介效应,异质信念的中介效应则不明显。进一步研究发现,国有企业、规模较大和破产风险较大的企业对财政刺激所产生的资金冲击的反应更加明显,而民营企业、规模较大和破产风险较小企业的管理者信念的中介效应更加显著。以上结果说明,财政刺激政策同时通过资金效应与信号效应影响企业投资效率,这为完善政策制定、提高施政水平提供了有益的借鉴。
Based on the research results of behavioral finance, this paper discusses the mediating effect of belief fluctuation on fiscal stimulus and corporate overinvestment behavior from the perspective of managers, and the selective response of different characteristics of enterprises to the fiscal stimulus and signal effect path. The study found that the implementation and withdrawal of fiscal stimulus policies caused the fluctuation of managers ’beliefs and heterogeneous beliefs, and the strong beliefs of managers and heterogeneous beliefs exacerbated the overinvestment behavior of enterprises. The managers’ belief in the fiscal stimulus and over-management Intermediary effects exist between investment behaviors, and the mediating effect of heterogeneous beliefs is not obvious. Further research finds that state-owned enterprises, enterprises with larger scale and higher bankruptcy risk react more obviously to the financial shock caused by fiscal stimulus, while the mediating effect of managers’ beliefs of private-owned enterprises, larger ones and smaller ones is more significant . The above results show that the fiscal stimulus policy at the same time through the financial and signaling effects affect the efficiency of corporate investment, which provides a useful reference for improving policy formulation and improving the level of governance.