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国家要求企业在生产中所排放的污染物数量要符合排放标准,环保部门随机监测,因此企业和环保部门之间存在博弈关系,此博弈存在一个混合策略Nash均衡。本文通过理论证明均衡存在,对模型进行分析得出Nash均衡,并结合新环保法中的政策说明如何采用博弈策略促进企业减排。
The state requires enterprises to discharge pollutants in production to meet the emission standards, environmental protection departments randomly monitored, so there is a game between enterprises and the environmental protection department, the game there is a hybrid strategy Nash equilibrium. This paper proves the existence of equilibrium through theoretical analysis of the model and draws a Nash equilibrium, combined with the policy of the new environmental protection law shows how to use game strategy to promote emission reduction.