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许多研究发现,国有企业存在冗余雇员,但是,对国有企业冗员的原因存在不同观点。本文利用《劳动合同法》引起劳动力成本上升作为自然实验,检验劳动力成本变化对国有企业和民营企业之间劳动力雇佣政策差异的影响,并以此清晰地推断国有企业存在冗余雇员的原因。本文发现,劳动力成本急剧上升对国有企业劳动力雇佣政策对冗员的敏感性产生了更大影响,即国有企业相对于民营企业解雇了更多员工。本文证据支持了国有企业存在劳动力冗员的管理者代理成本理论和管理者偏好“平静生活”的理论。
Many studies find that there are redundant employees in state-owned enterprises. However, there are different views on the reasons for redundant state-owned enterprises. This paper uses Labor Contract Law to raise labor costs as a natural experiment to examine the impact of changes in labor costs on labor employment policy differences between SOEs and private-owned enterprises and to conclusively reason why redundant SOEs exist. This paper finds that the sharp rise in labor costs has a greater impact on the sensitivity of redundant workers to the employment policies of state-owned enterprises, that is, SOEs have laid off more employees than private-owned ones. The evidence in this paper supports the theory of manager agency costs and managers’ preferences for the existence of labor redundancy in state-owned enterprises.