论文部分内容阅读
在两权分离的公司制企业中,委托人通过和代理人签订基于剩余索取权分配的激励合同,使代理人为委托人的利益最大化而努力。对于实行分公司制管理模式的省级电网公司来说,公司与分公司之间也存在着内部代理关系,其目前的管理模式决定了分公司在使用公司内部资源时存在着争夺资源和资源利用效率不高等问题。作者分析了省级电网公司在新的电力市场环境中面临的挑战,提出分公司必须加强自身投资约束,规范投资行为,并建立了省级电网公司基于内部资金配置效率的委托-代理模型。在对该模型进行分析讨论后认为,分公司在使用省级电网公司资金时,必须承担一定的风险,建立资金使用风险激励机制能够有效地防止发生分公司利用投资寻租行为,讨论了影响风险激励系数和代理成本的因素,同时给出了以分公司固定资产回报率为产出系数的激励合同设计实例。
In the separation of the two companies of the corporate system, the principal and the agent signed by the residual claim based on the distribution of the incentive contract, so that the agent to maximize the interests of the principal and work. For the provincial power grid companies that implement the branch company management mode, the internal agency relationship exists between the company and the branch offices. The current management mode determines that the branch companies have the resources and resources for the use of the company internal resources Efficiency is not high and so on. The author analyzes the challenges that the provincial power grid companies face in the new electricity market environment. It points out that the branch companies must strengthen their investment constraints and regulate their investment behaviors, and establish the commission-agent model based on the internal fund allocation efficiency of provincial power grid companies. After analyzing and discussing this model, we believe that branch companies must take certain risks when using provincial power grid company funds. Establishing a fund-using risk incentive mechanism can effectively prevent sub-branches from using rent-seeking activities and discussing risks affecting risks Incentive coefficient and agency cost factors, at the same time given the rate of return on fixed assets branch of the output coefficient of the incentive contract design examples.