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对罗尔斯的法治理论有两种解读,一种是形式法治论,另一种是实质法治论。但形式法治论不能解释罗尔斯对法律的形式要求源自对自由的保证,而实质法治论证又不能解释为何罗尔斯认为法治与不正义是相容的。如果将对自由的保证看做是对权力正当性的形式要求,则可以很好地理解罗尔斯对法治的论述。在这种理解的基础上,探讨以权力正当性的形式要求为基础的形式法治论,可以说明形式法治的道德价值在于削弱权力本身之恶。
There are two kinds of interpretations of Rawls’s theory of the rule of law, one is the formal rule of law and the other is the substantive rule of law. However, the formal rule of law can not explain that Rawls’s formal requirement of law stems from the guarantee of freedom, and the substantive rule of law argument can not explain why Rawls thinks the rule of law is compatible with injustice. If we regard the guarantee of freedom as the formal requirement of the legitimacy of power, we can get a good understanding of Rawls’s treatise on the rule of law. On the basis of this understanding, exploring the formal rule of law based on formal requirements of power legitimacy shows that the moral value of formal rule of law lies in weakening the evil of power itself.