基于动态博弈的媒体参与下网络舆情机制分析

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【目的/意义】如何理清网络舆情的传播机制,从而有效引导与管理网络行为,成为政府的重要任务。【方法/过程】针对媒体参与报道的网络舆情传播,建立了媒体与政府,网民与意见领袖的两类博弈模型,将考虑公平因素的收益函数引入博弈收益矩阵中。运用向前归纳法建立三阶段动态博弈,对媒体和意见领袖选择非子博弈完美均衡路径的具体条件进行分析,推导出收益变化率θ的阈值。【结果/结论】针对不同阈值条件下各方最优策略,给出政府应对和管理网络舆情的最优策略。 [Purpose / Significance] How to sort out the spread mechanism of online public opinion so as to effectively guide and manage online behavior has become an important task of the government. 【Methods / Procedures】 According to the media’s public opinion dissemination, we established two kinds of game models of media, government, netizens and opinion leaders, and introduced the return function of fairness into the game return matrix. By using the forward induction method to establish the three-stage dynamic game, this paper analyzes the specific conditions for the media and opinion leaders to choose the perfect equilibrium path of non-subgame and deduces the threshold of the rate of return of the income. [Results / Conclusions] According to the optimal strategy of each party under different threshold conditions, the optimal strategy of government to cope with and manage network public opinion is given.
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