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1949至1978年,国家权力对农村的调控是通过国家—农村基层干部—农民这一模式来完成的。在此期间,为促使既定工业化战略尽快实现,国家给农村基层干部施加过重压力,甚至采取一些不适当方式,对之进行调整和控制。对上级交代的任务,农村基层干部一般是积极响应的,与农民的特殊关系,又使他们有时自觉不自觉地与农民站在一起,对一些难以实现或对农民不利的上级指令存有抵触情绪,在执行时阳奉阴违。过高的统购指标迫使基层干部对农民采取一些过激行为,公社制度下的分配制度又使其与农民产生直接利益冲突,这迫使农民在基本顺从干部管理情况下,又以“反行为”来表达其显性或隐形对抗。国家—农村基层干部—农民间的这种非良性互动致使农村社会矛盾激化,也是农村现代化进程受阻的重要原因之一。
From 1949 to 1978, the state power regulation of the countryside was accomplished through the model of “state-rural grassroots cadres and peasants.” In the meantime, in order to bring about the scheduled industrialization strategy as soon as possible, the state has put too much pressure on rural grassroots cadres and even taken some inappropriate ways to adjust and control them. Responding to the tasks confronted by the higher authorities, the grassroots cadres in rural areas generally responded positively. The special relationship with peasants also made them sometimes consciously and unconsciously stand with peasants and put forward resistance to higher orders that were hard to come by or far-off to peasants , In the implementation of yang Feng Yin violation. Too high the state-owned stock index forced grass-roots cadres to take some overbearing behavior toward peasants, and the distribution system under the commune system made them have direct conflicts of interests with peasants. This forced peasants to “act in opposition” To express its explicit or invisible confrontation. This unhealthy interaction between the state-grassroots cadres at the village level and peasants has intensified the social contradictions in rural areas and is also one of the major reasons for the obstruction of the process of rural modernization.