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In recent years many security attacks occur when malicious codes abuse in-process memory resources.Due to the increasing complexity,an application program may call third-party code which cannot be controlled by programmers but may contain security vulnerabilities.As a result,the users have the risk of suffering information leakage and control flow hijacking.However,current solutions like Intel memory protection extensions (MPX) severely degrade performance,while other approaches like Intel memory protection keys (MPK) lack flexibility in dividing security domains.In this paper,we propose IMPULP,an effective and efficient hardware approach for in-process memory protection.The rationale of IMPULP is user-level partitioning that user code segments are divided into different security domains according to their instruction addresses,and accessible memory spaces are specified dynamically for each domain via a set of boundary registers.Each instruction related to memory access will be checked according to its security domain and the corresponding boundaries,and illegal in-process memory access of untrusted code segments will be prevented.IMPULP can be leveraged to prevent a wide range of in-process memory abuse attacks,such as buffer overflows and memory leakages.For verification,an FPGA prototype based on RISC-V instruction set architecture has been developed.We present eight tests to verify the effectiveness of IMPULP,including five memory protection function tests,a test to defense typical buffer overflow,a test to defense famous memory leakage attack named Heartbleed,and a test for security benchmark.We execute the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark programs to evaluate the efficiency of IMPULP.The performance overhead of IMPULP is less than 0.2％ runtime on average,which is negligible.Moreover,the resource overhead is less than 5.5％ for hardware modification of IMPULP.