本文研究了协调多零售商横向转载的收益共享契约。该契约包含批发价格和收益共享比例两个参数,由独立于零售商的第三方转载公司制定并实施。在建立多零售商转载博弈模型的基础上,给出了该契约协调零售商转载的充分必要条件;然后以包含两个零售商的转载系统为例,分别给出了协调情形下转载价格和收益共享比例需满足的条件及其解析表达形式,并设计了一类启发式算法来计算零售商的最优订货量、转载价格和期望利润。最后,通过一个算例对文中的相关研究结论进行了验证,并就相关参数对零售商期望收益的影响进行了分析。研究发现,收益共享是对称性零售商的占优选择;非对称情形下,较高的转载成本将导致协调情形下零售商的期望利润降低;较高的产品残值将要求选择较低的转载价格,确保协调契约对于零售商期望利润的帕累托改进;当产品的边际价值较高时,提高转载价格可改善零售商的期望利润;另外,灵敏度分析显示契约参数将显著影响非对称性零售商的期望利润。 This paper studies the revenue sharing contract that coordinates multi-retailers’ horizontal reprinting. The contract contains the wholesale price and revenue sharing ratio of two parameters, independent of the retailer’s third-party companies to develop and implement. Based on the establishment of a multi-retailer reloading game model, the sufficient and necessary conditions for the retailer to reprint the contract are given. Then, taking the reprint system containing two retailers as an example, the paper presents the repricing prices and benefits Share ratio to meet the conditions and analytical expressions, and designed a heuristic algorithm to calculate the retailer’s optimal order quantity, reprint price and expected profit. Finally, a case study is used to validate the relevant research findings and analyze the impact of relevant parameters on the expected returns of retailers. The research finds that revenue sharing is the dominant choice of symmetric retailers. Under the asymmetric situation, the higher reprint cost will result in the decrease of expected profit of retailers under the coordination situation. The higher residual value of products will require the choice of lower reprint Price to ensure the Pareto improvement of the coordination contract for the retailer’s expected profit; raising the repricing price improves the retailer’s expected profit when the product’s marginal value is higher; and the sensitivity analysis shows that the contractual parameters will significantly affect the asymmetric retail sales Business profit expectations.