本文构建完全信息博弈模型对租客的寻租行为可能性进行分析,通过对租客不同行为选择和监管人不同工作态度博弈分析发现,较高的激励水平能够促使监管人努力工作,从而降低寻租行为发生的可能性。对模型扩展的不完全信息博弈表明,监管制度完善水平不同时,寻租成本的会影响租客的寻租行为发生概率,增加寻租行为风险。 In this paper, a complete information game model is constructed to analyze the possibility of rent-seeking behavior of tenants. By analyzing the different behaviors of tenants and the different work attitude of supervisors, it is found that the higher incentive level can encourage supervisors to work hard, Possibility of renting. The game of incomplete information on model expansion shows that rent-seeking costs will affect the probability of rent-seeking behavior of tenants and increase the risk of rent-seeking behavior when the level of perfection of regulatory system is different.