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Abstract： Ever since it was established as an academic discipline， Chinese philosophy has always been comparative philosophy， and hence research in contemporary Chinese philosophy cannot be separated from the perspectives and methods of comparative philosophy. If contemporary Chinese philosophers wish to achieve a philosophical breakthrough， the key lies in grasping the “Chinese philosophical sensibility，” that is， the problems within Chinese philosophy which possess originary significance in their own right. A large number of scholars have recognized production （sheng） as the root source of the Chinese philosophical sensibility， and production and reproduction （shengsheng） or life （shenghuo） is the wellspring of new developments in contemporary Confucian philosophical theory. The present author believes that Chinese philosophy must return to its roots in opening up new developments， namely concretizing theoretical construction through the interpretation of classical texts， so as to truly realize new philosophical advances. Bringing the perspectives and methods of comparative philosophy to the fore， the philosophy of intentionality （yi） holds that the original substance of intentionality penetrates throughout the dao， and utilizes line-by-line commentaries on classical texts such as the Daodejing and Book of Changes in order to concretize a theoretical philosophical construction that is both systematic and based on the original substance of “intentionality，” thereby promoting an all-new entrance of Chinese philosophy as comparative philosophy onto the world philosophy stage.
Keywords： comparative philosophy， Chinese philosophy， philosophy of intentionality， production and reproduction， theory of foundational intentionality
Modern and contemporary Chinese philosophy is at root a form of comparative philosophy. Research in Chinese philosophy today is inseparable both from reference to Western philosophy， and even more so from the framework of the Chinese philosophical sensibility itself， the way in which one deals with these two aspects must go beyond simply methodology. Through an analysis of how modern and contemporary Chinese philosophers have understood the Western philosophical tradition and compared it with Chinese philosophy， as well as how they have faced， investigated， and reflected on fundamental problems in Chinese philosophy such as production and reproduction （shengsheng 生生） and dao-substance （daoti 道體）， thereby extracting a systematic philosophical doctrine， this paper explores various contemporary systematic constructions in Chinese philosophy， and thus teases out the unique qualities and possible theoretical contribution of the constructive approach of the philosophical thought of the theory of foundational intentionality. Contemporary Chinese Philosophy as Comparative Philosophy
[Refer to page 4 for Chinese. Similarly hereinafter]
The path followed by Yu Dunkang 余敦康 （1930–2019） in his academic studies is representative of scholars from the previous generation in their continual search for “what is Chinese philosophy” or “what is philosophy from China.” Lecture Notes from an Introduction to Philosophy [哲學导论讲记] is a record of one of Professor Yu’s twelve-lecture courses at Peking University， a summary of his lifelong philosophical explorations. He always felt that this book required some rethinking and rewriting prior to publication， yet before he could complete such revisions， he unfortunately passed away. In his lectures， Professor Yu did not merely discuss Chinese philosophy， but also set out his understanding of Western and Indian philosophy， although his explanations of the latter were relatively general. Professor Yu’s studies of the Book of Changes can basically be seen as following the approach of the meaning–principle school. He strongly wished to expound the “philosophy” of Changes studies， yet finally did not achieve a philosophical breakthrough in Changes studies.
Professor Yu and other scholars of the previous generation had the same consciousness of problems concerning Chinese philosophy， and made great efforts in this regard， attempting to establish a system of Chinese philosophy. However， Yu Dunkang himself was dissatisfied with the results of the research guided by this problem-consciousness： on the one hand， if he wishes to expound Chinese philosophy clearly， he must inevitably confront various alien philosophical traditions such as Western and Indian philosophy; on the other hand， he suffered from the insufficiency of his understanding and research into Western and Indian philosophy. In fact， this problem was not merely one faced by Yu and his contemporaries， but was also one that earlier generation of scholars such as Feng Youlan 冯友兰 （1895–1990） had already faced when they began to attempt to reconstruct Chinese philosophy. Indeed， it is perhaps a kind of unavoidable destiny for Chinese philosophy.
Research into Chinese philosophy cannot do without a method， nor can it avoid discussing methodology. However， if one considers purely methodological questions， this easily falls into researching methods solely for the purpose of methodological questions， and thus leads to such so-called methods being difficult to concretize in both one’s own research and that of others. At the present stage， it seems that there is no universally valid methodology for Chinese philosophy， and the significance of discussing methodologies often merely adds an extra dimension for research or a new method， and provides scarce assistance for research into problems themselves. ‘Production’ as the Root Source of the
‘Chinese Philosophical Sensibility’ [6]
More important than methods themselves is how they are concretized in research into specific problems. In the preface to his Methodology in the Humanities： An Ontological Exploration of the Source of Hermeneutics [人文学的方法论：诠释的存有学探源]， Lin An-wu 林安梧 has discussed the interpretation of the meaning of the life-world， arguing that the interpretation of meaning includes intention–images （yixiang 意象） as well as meaning （yiyi 意义）， a viewpoint that is similar to that of the philosophy of intentionality. That production （sheng 生） is the general root-source of creativity is the Chinese philosophical sensibility， and the fundamental starting point of Confucianism in particular.
The view that “production and reproduction are what is called change” （Book of Changes， “Appended Remarks I” [系辞上]） can be clearly found in Confucianism， Daoism， and Buddhism. In his New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness [新唯识论]， Xiong Shili 熊十力 （1885–1968） opposed understanding emptiness （kong 空） as extinction or disappearance， and criticized Buddhists who did not discuss the original state of the world as production and reproduction without cease. Xiong asserted that， although the theories of original substance and ontology discussed in Buddhist sutras were reasonable， they were deficient in that they failed to emphasize that the world’s original existential state possesses a vital force and productive power. The vital force of production should be concretized in the life of every individual， since without vital force there is no way to understand the productive power and life through which the world exists and progresses. As soon as individual consciousness ceases moving， there is no way to understand the world’s vital force and production and reproduction without cease. Influenced by Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 （1909–1995）， Ding Yun 丁耘 approved of his use of Aristotle’s doctrine of four causes to explain the conception of production and reproduction， arguing that the “production and reproduction” of the Commentaries on the Book of Changes [易傳] and the Doctrine of the Mean [中庸] can be connected together with Aristotle’s problem of infinite motion， and going on to list a variety of intellectual resources from Chinese philosophy that thus be brought to bear on it. His dao-substance learning （daoti xue 道体学） emphasized the dao-substance’s aspect of production and reproduction without cease， the dimension of production and reproduction found in the ontology of Chinese philosophy. Sun Xiangchen’s 孙向晨 On the Family： Individual and Intimacy [论家：个体与亲亲] was developed from his earlier article titled “Production and Reproduction： Existing Between the Generations” [生生：在世代之中存在]. Yang Zebo 杨泽波 has also proposed a theory concerning the “Confucian ethics of production and reproduction.” All these scholars have thus used an almost identical academic system of discourse in relation to similar problems. As for the “life-world” （shenghuo shijie 生活世界） discussed by Lin An-wu， the general root-source of creativity is construed as sheng 生 （production）， while the really-existing activity that unifies body and mind as one is huo 活 （life）; shi 世 （generations） refers to the process of time that is continuous without cease， while jie 界 （bounds） refers to the vast yet determinate separation of space. This amounts to giving an interpretation of Husserl’s Lebenswelt （life-world） in terms of Chinese philosophy. The life-world discussed by Lin An-wu shares some similarities with Huang Yushun’s 黄玉顺 concept of Living Confucianism （shenghuo ruxue 生活儒学）， which also includes a similar philosophical interpretation.
From the above， it should be evident that the problem of “production” is in fact the core problem opened up by the modernization of Chinese philosophy. As the originary realm of a fundamental philosophical sensibility， production has been interpreted by different authors using different methods， with assistance from different classical texts， and given philosophical exposition. Here， the problem-consciousness all arose in terms of production and reproduction without cease. These philosophers all attempted to connect together their own understandings of the various philosophical sensibilities of cosmology， ontology， mind-nature theory， and praxis， in terms of the philosophical significance of production.
How then should one use the discourse system of the philosophy of intentionality to expound “production and reproduction”？ The heart of the system of the philosophy of intentionality is “intention （yi 意），” which can be expounded in different ways by means of different classical texts. For example， the argument of Illuminating Intentionality through the Zhouyi： New Explorations in the Philosophy of the Book of Changes [周易明意：周易哲学新探] begins from the dimension of the “production of intention” from the hexagram Qian 乾， corresponding to the hexagram image of the house of Qian， that is， the eight hexagrams of the house of Qian representing the idea of creativity and production and reproduction without cease， corresponding to the ontological state of existence of the world; likewise， Illuminating the Daodejing and Its Intentionality [道德經明意] explicates how intentionality grasping the dao can be known through the “production of dao，” that is， dao’s state of production and reproduction without cease and spontaneous creation. The conceptions of production referred to by different classical texts have their common points. Many scholars have used production and reproduction to grasp the core of Chinese philosophy， and if one lacks personal experience and recognition of the productive power of the cosmos， it is very difficult to expound the Chinese philosophical sensibility， that is， the inner significance of Chinese philosophy. If one uses modern language to explicate productive power， the corresponding terms would be creativity and creative force. In simple terms， if Chinese philosophy is to be made more philosophical， the precondition and starting point should both be production. Otherwise， discussion of problems in Chinese philosophy can easily slip into structural or external research， and it is then difficult to reveal their philosophical sensibility. Today， it has become universally accepted that， if one wishes to make Chinese philosophy more philosophical， then one ought to emphasize production， productive power， and creativity. This can be seen in Lin An-wu’s continuation of the tradition of Mou Zongsan and Xiong Shili， Huang Yushun’s transformation of Heidegger’s philosophical significance， Ding Yun’s use of dao-substance learning to correct Western learning， and Sun Xiangchen’s emphasis on the production and reproduction without cease of the family to help reorient the debates between ancient and modern and East and West. By the same token， the philosophy of intentionality emphasizes the significance of productive power， and takes this as the root-source to make Chinese philosophy more philosophical， holding that our generation of Chinese philosophy scholars ought to have personal experience of the inner productive power of Chinese philosophy.
Confucianism Confronting Life and Philosophers
Confronting Classical Texts [7]
In his doctoral thesis “Transcending the Tension between Knowledge and Value： On the Controversy between Science and Metaphysics” [超越知識与价值的紧张：“科学与玄学论战”的哲学问题]， Huang Yushun has discussed Husserl’s conception of intentionality， connected it to Mencius’s innate ability （liangneng 良能）， and discussed Husserl’s Lebenswelt， ideas which later become organic parts of his system of thought. To a certain degree， Huang’s Living Confucianism inherits various doctrines from his doctoral supervisor Meng Peiyuan’s 蒙培元 Affective Confucianism （qinggan ruxue 情感儒学）. Living Confucianism is a form of Confucian philosophy in the modern transition， and a purely academic and philosophical system of intellectual thought. Works connected to Living Confucianism make use of a great deal of Heideggerian abstruse language， such that those who find it difficult to understand include not only the ordinary reading public， but also occasionally some scholars. For example， life is nothingness—life is absence， non-being， emptiness—this can be completely demonstrated in philosophy， but is very difficult to understand in an everyday context.
Mou Zhongjian’s 牟钟鉴 A New Conception of Benevolent Learning： The Pursuit of Love [新仁学构想：爱的追寻] is compatible both with the “ability to love” proposed by Huang Yushun as the true essence of Confucianism， as well as with the spirit of production and reproduction emphasized by Yang Lihua 杨立华， Sun Xiangchen， and Ding Yun. Huang Yushun’s Living Confucianism sets out from the great root and source of production， and with regard to the question of how life should be produced or lived， it has a set of phenomenological observations， as well as emphasizing returning to life itself and its originary structure， within life and through living. According to the Confucian approach， life is first and foremost in the presence of love—the love of parents and of those around us， and only when people experience love can they be able to love others. Different from Confucianism， Daoism can be said to have no question of loving or not loving， since we all follow dao in our conduct， as when Guo Xiang 郭象 （ca. 252–312） spoke of lone-transformation （duhua 独化）. As can be seen， love is an expression of the Confucian bestowal of meaning， and represents Confucians’ understanding of life and productive power. The basis for benevolent love comes from the productive power of the cosmos. Concretized in human feelings this means one must love， yet this “must” is neither absolute nor inevitable， but rather emphasizes its “ought” in logical terms—you ought to love， because you have the ability to love; since other people love you and enable you to live， you ought to love them. The same logic applies to filial piety， which is based on the experience of a kind of situational care of parents for oneself， one that requires that the individual should return it. Scholars of philosophy frequently face ethical problems. Although philosophy does discuss concrete problems， such as the practical topics of philosophy found in social and political philosophy， these generally include two aspects： how to change one’s own life， and how to change one’s social context. Confucianism not only demands self-cultivation and the nurturing of one’s inherent nature， but also contains a strong aspiration and power to change one’s era. Although Confucius himself can be said to have failed in his political efforts， the meaning of his life was not limited to this， but rather lay in his editing of the Book of Poetry and the Book of History and determining rites and music after his retirement， through which he proposed a set of Confucian doctrines. The mission of thinkers is to propose conceptions for the people of the world， and such thoughts and conceptions should not necessarily be limited to directly serving concrete matters. Many of Confucius’s doctrines derived from his reinterpretation of classical texts—elaboration by “transmitting and not creating” （Analects 7：1） maintains its values within the ebb and flow of history， and as later Confucians we should learn from， inherit and promote these values.
How Innovation Is Possible in Chinese Philosophy：
The Interpretation of Classical Texts and the
Construction of Rational Arguments [9]
When constructing the Chinese philosophical sensibility of this era， aside from locating the vital source of Chinese philosophy itself， we should at the same also be sure not to become detached from present life and its conceptual manifestation. The Book of Changes encompasses the rich thought of traditional Chinese philosophy， and through an interpretation of the Book of Changes that returns to the root， it may be possible to achieve the construction and renewal of a philosophical system of the Changes learning in this era. It should be noted that the various interpretations of the Book of Changes can be seen as meanings reconstructed by different philosophers on its basis， and not as the original meaning of the Book of Changes itself.
In terms of the starting point and problem-consciousness of the philosophy of intentionality， it is unnecessary to deliberately stress to Western people that China has philosophy， or to attempt to prove that China has the problems of Chinese philosophy and its own system of rational arguments. Despite the dominant Western discourse system’s tendency to exclude Chinese philosophy from philosophy， the millennia-old Chinese philosophical sensibility remains continuous and unbroken， and will not cease to exist simply because of doubting voices from the West. In this sense， the so-called problem of the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy is in fact a “false problem，” since， as long as there are those who inherit it， the dao of Chinese philosophy will not be broken. Every era will have some people who reflect deeply on the Chinese philosophical sensibility， and their choices are on made with free will—only when one is committed to this will one devote oneself to it. Hence， regardless of how the West denies the philosophy from China， this cannot constitute a fatal injury or attack， nor will it erase the possibility of the generation and development of the dao of Chinese philosophy. However， on the other hand， only if scholars also reflect seriously on and respond to this question will they truly be able to understand the embarrassing situation of Chinese philosophy on the world stage. In comparison to the results of contemporary reflections on the way forward for Chinese philosophy， the problem-consciousness of the philosophy of intentionality in Illuminating the Daodejing and Its Intentionality and Illuminating Intentionality through the Zhouyi： New Explorations in the Philosophy of the Book of Changes can be said to stick closer to the Chinese tradition of classical textual interpretation—holding that new developments in Chinese philosophy today should still revolve around making the most purely philosophical interpretations of classical texts possible， and adopting a method similar to that of Zhu Xi 朱熹 （1130–1200） or Guo Xiang， and explaining classical texts through a novel system of rational arguments. Is this kind of method “safer”？ In fact， the historical and hermeneutical value of a particular classical text can be predicted to a certain degree. If scholars examine the characteristics of the various texts that have been passed down to the present， it is not hard to deduce what kind of hermeneutical text is able to possess sufficient vitality to continue its transmission. Furthermore， the length and strength of a classical text’s interpretation and transmission is only connected to its new intention （meaning）， a fact that requires that explanations of classical texts must aim to possess the characteristic of innovation in the era in which they find themselves. In Illuminating Intentionality through the Zhouyi： New Explorations in the Philosophy of the Book of Changes， one point of innovation is the proposing of a new diagram of interchanging hexagrams on the basis of the doctrine of interchanging hexagrams found in Ma Hengjun’s 马恒君 Orthodox Book of Changes [周易正宗]. In comparison to historical explanations of interchanging hexagrams， this new diagram of interchanging hexagrams strives to explicate the prior and posterior context of each hexagram and line clearly and more systematically， such that the entire explanatory system is extremely “regular，” enabling the doctrine of interchanging hexagrams that has been the subject of much debate for two-thousand years to be displayed in a linguistic form that is lucid and comprehensible. King Wen’s Square and Round Diagrams of Interchanging Hexagrams [文王卦變方圆图] represent a theoretical breakthrough in relation to historical doctrines of interchanging hexagrams. Another point of innovation in Illuminating Intentionality through the Zhouyi： New Explorations in the Philosophy of the Book of Changes is the philosophical construction of the theory of foundational intentionality （yiben lun 意本论）， which is carried out in each hexagram and line by providing them with a philosophical explanation and new meaning， one which is of course based on the history of interpretations of hexagrams and lines from ancient times to the present. Every book that offers explanations of classical texts has its own inherent value， and waits to be taken up by later readers. The inner vitality of contemporary commentaries and explanations of texts such as the Book of Changes and the Daodejing is dependent on their acceptance and examination in the long river of history. Reflecting on the contemporary situation， the interpretation of classical texts and the construction of systems of rational arguments like those of the West can be said to represent two different orientations for innovation in Chinese philosophy in the present era. Among them， the latter to a great degree strives to provide an answer against the intense background of the afore-mentioned crisis of legitimacy. The common point shared between the two paths however lies in the fact that they both strive to manifest the part of Chinese philosophy that makes it philosophical.
The Entrance of Chinese Philosophy as Comparative Philosophy [11]
Although Chinese philosophy has its own inner problem-consciousness， this is understood differently by different scholars. For example， Li Zehou’s 李泽厚 philosophy is a theory of foundational feeling （qingben lun 情本论）; Sun Xiangchen’s is a theory of foundational family （jiaben lun 家本論）， emphasizing that the original substance of the family has the meaning of production and reproduction; the basic question grasped by Ding Yun’s dao-substance learning is dao， and he sets out from this in his argument and reconstruction. Chen Lai’s 陈来 ontology of benevolent learning （renxue bentilun 仁学本体论） takes the benevolent learning of Confucians throughout history and interprets their aspects of ontological thinking from an ontological dimension， making them become a set of fused doctrines， and can thus be said to use the history of philosophy to reinterpret the content of benevolence （ren 仁）. In his analyses， Chen emphasizes ontological access to the production and reproduction of benevolence： “New Original Benevolence [新原仁] researches deeply into the fundamental meaning of benevolence， and establishes an ontology of benevolence.”
An important question in the entrance of Chinese philosophy as comparative philosophy is how to construct a new Chinese philosophy. The method of construction used by Sun Xiangchen and Ding Yun is problematic construction， bringing out the core problems of Chinese philosophy. When Sun takes family as substance and Ding takes dao as substance， they unfold classic works and provide them with arguments and explanations， “relying on these to assess and assimilate Western learning” at the same time as carrying out their interpretations. Sun emphasizes that “familism” is the core value of the Chinese cultural tradition.” Ding has said that， [I] stress the Book of Changes and the Doctrine of the Mean， while also consulting Daoist texts such as the Zhuangzi. . . . The rational arguments of dao-substance learning can proceed to the mind via inherent nature， and then becomes a school of inherent nature; it can also proceed to inherent nature via the mind and then becomes a school of mind . . . yet the fact that each school can transform perfectly into and interconnect with the other is something that cannot be realized without deep thought. . . . Hence this book acts as an introduction， and as for the relations between the various schools of dao learning and Western learning， it does not attempt to demonstrate these fully through rational arguments， but rather stresses the tradition of problems that each school provides.
He can be said to provide an overall analysis on the Chinese and Western philosophical traditions， holding that if one grasps the great root and source of Chinese philosophy， then after analyzing it clearly， one can use it to assess and assimilate Western philosophy.
A similar approach can be found in Gong Huanan’s 貢华南 Taste Thinking [味觉思想]， which takes taste （wei 味） as the main thread with which to arrange and analyze the history of ancient Chinese thought and develop a set of new explanations. Although Gong has not used taste to interpret Western philosophy， there seems to be no reason why he would be unable to do so if he so wished. Ding Yun fused the two aspects of interpreting Chinese and Western classical texts together， and from this perspective， the subject of dao-substance learning is both analytical and hermeneutic. However， the method of using dao-substance as the core with which to analyze and interpret hides a problem： as soon as the range of texts one covers is rather broad， its power of penetration will appear somewhat limited. For example， in the course of analysis， many classical texts seem to contain the problem of dao-substance， so can be quoted endlessly and indeed with some relevance， yet the work involved in this kind of argument often becomes one of lateral quotation or illustration， and thus further implies the undeniable and incontrovertible approach of demonstrating to Western philosophy that Chinese philosophy is indeed philosophy. Evidently， problematic methods of analysis or construction all face the dilemma of limited penetration.
In comparison， using the method of deep-level interpretation of classical texts and their meanings， the reading method of attempting to pass through past commentaries and explanations and enter into the linguistic context of classical texts， may be able to derive new systems of meaning， as well as possessing deeper penetrative power in terms of the vertical aspect of depth of rational argument. The method of the theory of foundational intentionality places such importance on explaining the meaning of the classics in order to pass through the explanations of classical texts from ancient times to the present， and thereby demonstrate that， apart from Western hermeneutic systems， it is still possible for contemporary scholars to base themselves on Chinese and Western readings of classical texts and strive to derive a systematic set of new explanations. It is for this reason that the theory of foundational intentionality chooses the vertical method and deep-level interpretive work of providing new explanations based on classical texts. Comprehending Dao through Intentions：
An Ideal Context of Consciousness [13]
The referential discussion of methodology above must all be brought together into a single core problem， namely that the way forward for contemporary Chinese philosophy still lies in returning to the most fundamental， original and great philosophical questions. This problem-consciousness itself connects together past and present， Chinese and Western， as in Li Zehou’s regarding feelings as fundamental， Mou Zhongjian and Chen Lai regarding benevolence as fundamental， Huang Yushun regarding life as fundamental， Sun Xiangchen regarding family as fundamental， Gong Huanan regarding taste as fundamental， and Lin An-wu and Ding Yun regarding dao as substance. If one profoundly faces fundamental philosophical questions and strives to give new readings based on classical texts， one may discover that one’s present physical body is merely something to be made use of， that ontological thinking concerning dao， production， and the like speaks through “me，” and that “my” intentions can be put into action through texts. As long as one condenses the intention of dao into one’s writings and works， other assessments and appraisals concerned with dao are no longer important. This consciousness of thinking philosophically is a personal experience of dao， one that in the philosophy of intentionality is called dao-intentionality （daoyi 道意）， that is， a state of unity between dao and an intention interpreted by means of language that is realized after undergoing a personal experience. The process of intentional comprehension refers directly to classical texts themselves， to a mutual resonance and affectivity between individuals and classical texts that transcend time and space， the things thus affected being then expressed through philosophical language， and thereby a meaningful manifestation of the great dao in the time and space of the present. Although traditional doctrines generally regarded dao as fundamental， as Laozi noted， “Since I do not know its name， I simply call it dao”—the intention of the theory of foundational intentionality， like dao， is simply a convenient means of expression.
The core ontological state of Chinese philosophy， in which substance （ti 体） and function （yong 用） are as one and not divided， implies that it cannot be grasped using a Western ontological dualism or doctrine of external transcendence based on God. What must be clearly stated is that Chinese philosophy is not like the either/or opposition between dualism and monism in Western philosophy. Chinese philosophy has very strong internal tensions within a form of immanent monism. How then should one face the original state of existence or being？ In Chinese philosophy， a problem like the body–mind relation more often manifests as the body and mind as one， using the mind to control the body. For example， the philosophy of intentionality emphasizes using thoughts to control and reflect on the changes of the mind and body， taking up the inner observation discussed in the Inner Canons of the Yellow Emperor [黃帝内经] and the Kinship of the Three in Accordance with the Book of Changes [周易参同契]， in which， when inner observation is mastered， the body seems to transform from a microcosm to a macrocosm. The state of the body becomes ever more closely correlated with both the sun and moon and with time and space， a kind of perceptual inner observation that is an observation of the greater dao. Consciousness in this state exists and can be utilized， the consciousness of the mind attaining a regulated state in which subject and object are fused and body and mind are interconnected as a unified whole， and hence this is also an intentional observation. The core concept emphasized by the philosophy of intentionality is intention. Intention is not the pure externality or object referred to in phenomenology， but rather simultaneously produces the two dimensions of intentionality and meaning： thoughts always have their external relations in their originary context， and only in such an originary and situational state can consciousness possess its power of existence and contextuality; it is also precisely in relation to such a state that the contextuality of consciousness can be produced. Thus in relation to Wang Yangming’s 王陽明 （1472–1528） view that “that which is produced by the mind is intention” and Liu Zongzhou’s 刘宗周 （1578–1645） view that “intentions are preserved by the mind， and not produced by the mind，” the philosophy of intentionality stresses Liu Zongzhou’s meaning.
The theory of foundational intentionality holds that， in terms of ontology， intentions are more important than dao， while in terms of epistemology， intentions are more important than the mind. If the consciousness of the mind’s inner observation has not yet attained a state of reflexivity， one will be unable to realize the mind’s state of production and reproduction without cease. As a form of existence that is capable of producing and bestowing activity， following the production and reproduction of the mind and cosmos， the power of intention responds to and unifies with the productive power of nature， and in such resonance between intentions and the living cosmos， intention realizes itself as a special kind of relation between mind and things.
Before intentionality is understood and experienced， there is a pre-conscious state or state of pre-consciousness; after intentionality is manifested or concretized， one can speak of consciousness or thought. The existence of consciousness or thought is inseparable from its inner productive power or force， as well as from its external context， since the existential state of intention is inseparable from the context in which mind and things are interconnected. Of course， since such a context is inseparable from the contextuality of the world， so consciousness is in fact being and yet non-being. In other words， “intentionality” can be cultivated in a broad and vast context. If intentions are only based on immediate things， then consciousness merely remains in a situational state that is immediately produced; however， if intentions are based on the world as a whole， even though the context of intentions is still contingent and temporary， it can attain a holistic and transcendent state， one in which human intention comprehends the intentions of Heaven， in which individual consciousness is transcended through a unity of Heaven and humanity （tian ren heyi 天人合一）. When the Daodejing speaks of “embracing the One” （baoyi 抱一）， when the Book of Changes speaks of “unifying one’s virtue with Heaven and Earth，” and when the Doctrine of the Mean speaks of “forming a trinity with Heaven and Earth，” they all express this kind of ideal situation of consciousness in which human intentionality is unified with the intentionality of Heaven and Earth， an intentionality of Heaven and humanity that transcends immediate everyday life. In conclusion， both the “intentionality of Heaven and humanity” of Illuminating Intentionality through the Zhouyi： New Explorations in the Philosophy of the Book of Changes and the “intentionality of nature” of Illuminating the Daodejing and Its Intentionality represent the Chinese philosophical sensibility， and are the most central meaning of dao in the Chinese philosophical classics. If one lacks a personal experience that interconnects the dao of Heaven with human affairs （the dao-substance）， it can be difficult to bring forth the expressions and arguments of Chinese philosophy from ancient times to the present. Although this Chinese philosophical sensibility in which dao-substance implies an intentionality of Heaven and humanity can seem immanent， it in fact unifies immanence and transcendence， and thus is capable of transcending immediate existence. Research on Chinese philosophy today needs to understand and express this Chinese philosophical sensibility， making it “able to be spoken” （Daodejing， chap. 1） and formed into the written word， making the intentionality of nature exist as eternally as the intentionality of nature itself. The significance of the philosophy of intentionality based on the theory of foundational intentionality lies in its exploration of the Chinese philosophical sensibility as the eternal truth of Chinese classical texts， enabling its inner charm to transcend space and time like the classics themselves， being passed down from generation to generation， such that the inexhaustible intentionality of the great dao between Heaven and Earth is carried and continued by the illuminated intentionality of the classics.
Translated by Benjamin M. Coles
Keywords： comparative philosophy， Chinese philosophy， philosophy of intentionality， production and reproduction， theory of foundational intentionality
Modern and contemporary Chinese philosophy is at root a form of comparative philosophy. Research in Chinese philosophy today is inseparable both from reference to Western philosophy， and even more so from the framework of the Chinese philosophical sensibility itself， the way in which one deals with these two aspects must go beyond simply methodology. Through an analysis of how modern and contemporary Chinese philosophers have understood the Western philosophical tradition and compared it with Chinese philosophy， as well as how they have faced， investigated， and reflected on fundamental problems in Chinese philosophy such as production and reproduction （shengsheng 生生） and dao-substance （daoti 道體）， thereby extracting a systematic philosophical doctrine， this paper explores various contemporary systematic constructions in Chinese philosophy， and thus teases out the unique qualities and possible theoretical contribution of the constructive approach of the philosophical thought of the theory of foundational intentionality. Contemporary Chinese Philosophy as Comparative Philosophy
[Refer to page 4 for Chinese. Similarly hereinafter]
The path followed by Yu Dunkang 余敦康 （1930–2019） in his academic studies is representative of scholars from the previous generation in their continual search for “what is Chinese philosophy” or “what is philosophy from China.” Lecture Notes from an Introduction to Philosophy [哲學导论讲记] is a record of one of Professor Yu’s twelve-lecture courses at Peking University， a summary of his lifelong philosophical explorations. He always felt that this book required some rethinking and rewriting prior to publication， yet before he could complete such revisions， he unfortunately passed away. In his lectures， Professor Yu did not merely discuss Chinese philosophy， but also set out his understanding of Western and Indian philosophy， although his explanations of the latter were relatively general. Professor Yu’s studies of the Book of Changes can basically be seen as following the approach of the meaning–principle school. He strongly wished to expound the “philosophy” of Changes studies， yet finally did not achieve a philosophical breakthrough in Changes studies.
Professor Yu and other scholars of the previous generation had the same consciousness of problems concerning Chinese philosophy， and made great efforts in this regard， attempting to establish a system of Chinese philosophy. However， Yu Dunkang himself was dissatisfied with the results of the research guided by this problem-consciousness： on the one hand， if he wishes to expound Chinese philosophy clearly， he must inevitably confront various alien philosophical traditions such as Western and Indian philosophy; on the other hand， he suffered from the insufficiency of his understanding and research into Western and Indian philosophy. In fact， this problem was not merely one faced by Yu and his contemporaries， but was also one that earlier generation of scholars such as Feng Youlan 冯友兰 （1895–1990） had already faced when they began to attempt to reconstruct Chinese philosophy. Indeed， it is perhaps a kind of unavoidable destiny for Chinese philosophy.
Research into Chinese philosophy cannot do without a method， nor can it avoid discussing methodology. However， if one considers purely methodological questions， this easily falls into researching methods solely for the purpose of methodological questions， and thus leads to such so-called methods being difficult to concretize in both one’s own research and that of others. At the present stage， it seems that there is no universally valid methodology for Chinese philosophy， and the significance of discussing methodologies often merely adds an extra dimension for research or a new method， and provides scarce assistance for research into problems themselves. ‘Production’ as the Root Source of the
‘Chinese Philosophical Sensibility’ [6]
More important than methods themselves is how they are concretized in research into specific problems. In the preface to his Methodology in the Humanities： An Ontological Exploration of the Source of Hermeneutics [人文学的方法论：诠释的存有学探源]， Lin An-wu 林安梧 has discussed the interpretation of the meaning of the life-world， arguing that the interpretation of meaning includes intention–images （yixiang 意象） as well as meaning （yiyi 意义）， a viewpoint that is similar to that of the philosophy of intentionality. That production （sheng 生） is the general root-source of creativity is the Chinese philosophical sensibility， and the fundamental starting point of Confucianism in particular.
The view that “production and reproduction are what is called change” （Book of Changes， “Appended Remarks I” [系辞上]） can be clearly found in Confucianism， Daoism， and Buddhism. In his New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness [新唯识论]， Xiong Shili 熊十力 （1885–1968） opposed understanding emptiness （kong 空） as extinction or disappearance， and criticized Buddhists who did not discuss the original state of the world as production and reproduction without cease. Xiong asserted that， although the theories of original substance and ontology discussed in Buddhist sutras were reasonable， they were deficient in that they failed to emphasize that the world’s original existential state possesses a vital force and productive power. The vital force of production should be concretized in the life of every individual， since without vital force there is no way to understand the productive power and life through which the world exists and progresses. As soon as individual consciousness ceases moving， there is no way to understand the world’s vital force and production and reproduction without cease. Influenced by Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 （1909–1995）， Ding Yun 丁耘 approved of his use of Aristotle’s doctrine of four causes to explain the conception of production and reproduction， arguing that the “production and reproduction” of the Commentaries on the Book of Changes [易傳] and the Doctrine of the Mean [中庸] can be connected together with Aristotle’s problem of infinite motion， and going on to list a variety of intellectual resources from Chinese philosophy that thus be brought to bear on it. His dao-substance learning （daoti xue 道体学） emphasized the dao-substance’s aspect of production and reproduction without cease， the dimension of production and reproduction found in the ontology of Chinese philosophy. Sun Xiangchen’s 孙向晨 On the Family： Individual and Intimacy [论家：个体与亲亲] was developed from his earlier article titled “Production and Reproduction： Existing Between the Generations” [生生：在世代之中存在]. Yang Zebo 杨泽波 has also proposed a theory concerning the “Confucian ethics of production and reproduction.” All these scholars have thus used an almost identical academic system of discourse in relation to similar problems. As for the “life-world” （shenghuo shijie 生活世界） discussed by Lin An-wu， the general root-source of creativity is construed as sheng 生 （production）， while the really-existing activity that unifies body and mind as one is huo 活 （life）; shi 世 （generations） refers to the process of time that is continuous without cease， while jie 界 （bounds） refers to the vast yet determinate separation of space. This amounts to giving an interpretation of Husserl’s Lebenswelt （life-world） in terms of Chinese philosophy. The life-world discussed by Lin An-wu shares some similarities with Huang Yushun’s 黄玉顺 concept of Living Confucianism （shenghuo ruxue 生活儒学）， which also includes a similar philosophical interpretation.
From the above， it should be evident that the problem of “production” is in fact the core problem opened up by the modernization of Chinese philosophy. As the originary realm of a fundamental philosophical sensibility， production has been interpreted by different authors using different methods， with assistance from different classical texts， and given philosophical exposition. Here， the problem-consciousness all arose in terms of production and reproduction without cease. These philosophers all attempted to connect together their own understandings of the various philosophical sensibilities of cosmology， ontology， mind-nature theory， and praxis， in terms of the philosophical significance of production.
How then should one use the discourse system of the philosophy of intentionality to expound “production and reproduction”？ The heart of the system of the philosophy of intentionality is “intention （yi 意），” which can be expounded in different ways by means of different classical texts. For example， the argument of Illuminating Intentionality through the Zhouyi： New Explorations in the Philosophy of the Book of Changes [周易明意：周易哲学新探] begins from the dimension of the “production of intention” from the hexagram Qian 乾， corresponding to the hexagram image of the house of Qian， that is， the eight hexagrams of the house of Qian representing the idea of creativity and production and reproduction without cease， corresponding to the ontological state of existence of the world; likewise， Illuminating the Daodejing and Its Intentionality [道德經明意] explicates how intentionality grasping the dao can be known through the “production of dao，” that is， dao’s state of production and reproduction without cease and spontaneous creation. The conceptions of production referred to by different classical texts have their common points. Many scholars have used production and reproduction to grasp the core of Chinese philosophy， and if one lacks personal experience and recognition of the productive power of the cosmos， it is very difficult to expound the Chinese philosophical sensibility， that is， the inner significance of Chinese philosophy. If one uses modern language to explicate productive power， the corresponding terms would be creativity and creative force. In simple terms， if Chinese philosophy is to be made more philosophical， the precondition and starting point should both be production. Otherwise， discussion of problems in Chinese philosophy can easily slip into structural or external research， and it is then difficult to reveal their philosophical sensibility. Today， it has become universally accepted that， if one wishes to make Chinese philosophy more philosophical， then one ought to emphasize production， productive power， and creativity. This can be seen in Lin An-wu’s continuation of the tradition of Mou Zongsan and Xiong Shili， Huang Yushun’s transformation of Heidegger’s philosophical significance， Ding Yun’s use of dao-substance learning to correct Western learning， and Sun Xiangchen’s emphasis on the production and reproduction without cease of the family to help reorient the debates between ancient and modern and East and West. By the same token， the philosophy of intentionality emphasizes the significance of productive power， and takes this as the root-source to make Chinese philosophy more philosophical， holding that our generation of Chinese philosophy scholars ought to have personal experience of the inner productive power of Chinese philosophy.
Confucianism Confronting Life and Philosophers
Confronting Classical Texts [7]
In his doctoral thesis “Transcending the Tension between Knowledge and Value： On the Controversy between Science and Metaphysics” [超越知識与价值的紧张：“科学与玄学论战”的哲学问题]， Huang Yushun has discussed Husserl’s conception of intentionality， connected it to Mencius’s innate ability （liangneng 良能）， and discussed Husserl’s Lebenswelt， ideas which later become organic parts of his system of thought. To a certain degree， Huang’s Living Confucianism inherits various doctrines from his doctoral supervisor Meng Peiyuan’s 蒙培元 Affective Confucianism （qinggan ruxue 情感儒学）. Living Confucianism is a form of Confucian philosophy in the modern transition， and a purely academic and philosophical system of intellectual thought. Works connected to Living Confucianism make use of a great deal of Heideggerian abstruse language， such that those who find it difficult to understand include not only the ordinary reading public， but also occasionally some scholars. For example， life is nothingness—life is absence， non-being， emptiness—this can be completely demonstrated in philosophy， but is very difficult to understand in an everyday context.
Mou Zhongjian’s 牟钟鉴 A New Conception of Benevolent Learning： The Pursuit of Love [新仁学构想：爱的追寻] is compatible both with the “ability to love” proposed by Huang Yushun as the true essence of Confucianism， as well as with the spirit of production and reproduction emphasized by Yang Lihua 杨立华， Sun Xiangchen， and Ding Yun. Huang Yushun’s Living Confucianism sets out from the great root and source of production， and with regard to the question of how life should be produced or lived， it has a set of phenomenological observations， as well as emphasizing returning to life itself and its originary structure， within life and through living. According to the Confucian approach， life is first and foremost in the presence of love—the love of parents and of those around us， and only when people experience love can they be able to love others. Different from Confucianism， Daoism can be said to have no question of loving or not loving， since we all follow dao in our conduct， as when Guo Xiang 郭象 （ca. 252–312） spoke of lone-transformation （duhua 独化）. As can be seen， love is an expression of the Confucian bestowal of meaning， and represents Confucians’ understanding of life and productive power. The basis for benevolent love comes from the productive power of the cosmos. Concretized in human feelings this means one must love， yet this “must” is neither absolute nor inevitable， but rather emphasizes its “ought” in logical terms—you ought to love， because you have the ability to love; since other people love you and enable you to live， you ought to love them. The same logic applies to filial piety， which is based on the experience of a kind of situational care of parents for oneself， one that requires that the individual should return it. Scholars of philosophy frequently face ethical problems. Although philosophy does discuss concrete problems， such as the practical topics of philosophy found in social and political philosophy， these generally include two aspects： how to change one’s own life， and how to change one’s social context. Confucianism not only demands self-cultivation and the nurturing of one’s inherent nature， but also contains a strong aspiration and power to change one’s era. Although Confucius himself can be said to have failed in his political efforts， the meaning of his life was not limited to this， but rather lay in his editing of the Book of Poetry and the Book of History and determining rites and music after his retirement， through which he proposed a set of Confucian doctrines. The mission of thinkers is to propose conceptions for the people of the world， and such thoughts and conceptions should not necessarily be limited to directly serving concrete matters. Many of Confucius’s doctrines derived from his reinterpretation of classical texts—elaboration by “transmitting and not creating” （Analects 7：1） maintains its values within the ebb and flow of history， and as later Confucians we should learn from， inherit and promote these values.
How Innovation Is Possible in Chinese Philosophy：
The Interpretation of Classical Texts and the
Construction of Rational Arguments [9]
When constructing the Chinese philosophical sensibility of this era， aside from locating the vital source of Chinese philosophy itself， we should at the same also be sure not to become detached from present life and its conceptual manifestation. The Book of Changes encompasses the rich thought of traditional Chinese philosophy， and through an interpretation of the Book of Changes that returns to the root， it may be possible to achieve the construction and renewal of a philosophical system of the Changes learning in this era. It should be noted that the various interpretations of the Book of Changes can be seen as meanings reconstructed by different philosophers on its basis， and not as the original meaning of the Book of Changes itself.
In terms of the starting point and problem-consciousness of the philosophy of intentionality， it is unnecessary to deliberately stress to Western people that China has philosophy， or to attempt to prove that China has the problems of Chinese philosophy and its own system of rational arguments. Despite the dominant Western discourse system’s tendency to exclude Chinese philosophy from philosophy， the millennia-old Chinese philosophical sensibility remains continuous and unbroken， and will not cease to exist simply because of doubting voices from the West. In this sense， the so-called problem of the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy is in fact a “false problem，” since， as long as there are those who inherit it， the dao of Chinese philosophy will not be broken. Every era will have some people who reflect deeply on the Chinese philosophical sensibility， and their choices are on made with free will—only when one is committed to this will one devote oneself to it. Hence， regardless of how the West denies the philosophy from China， this cannot constitute a fatal injury or attack， nor will it erase the possibility of the generation and development of the dao of Chinese philosophy. However， on the other hand， only if scholars also reflect seriously on and respond to this question will they truly be able to understand the embarrassing situation of Chinese philosophy on the world stage. In comparison to the results of contemporary reflections on the way forward for Chinese philosophy， the problem-consciousness of the philosophy of intentionality in Illuminating the Daodejing and Its Intentionality and Illuminating Intentionality through the Zhouyi： New Explorations in the Philosophy of the Book of Changes can be said to stick closer to the Chinese tradition of classical textual interpretation—holding that new developments in Chinese philosophy today should still revolve around making the most purely philosophical interpretations of classical texts possible， and adopting a method similar to that of Zhu Xi 朱熹 （1130–1200） or Guo Xiang， and explaining classical texts through a novel system of rational arguments. Is this kind of method “safer”？ In fact， the historical and hermeneutical value of a particular classical text can be predicted to a certain degree. If scholars examine the characteristics of the various texts that have been passed down to the present， it is not hard to deduce what kind of hermeneutical text is able to possess sufficient vitality to continue its transmission. Furthermore， the length and strength of a classical text’s interpretation and transmission is only connected to its new intention （meaning）， a fact that requires that explanations of classical texts must aim to possess the characteristic of innovation in the era in which they find themselves. In Illuminating Intentionality through the Zhouyi： New Explorations in the Philosophy of the Book of Changes， one point of innovation is the proposing of a new diagram of interchanging hexagrams on the basis of the doctrine of interchanging hexagrams found in Ma Hengjun’s 马恒君 Orthodox Book of Changes [周易正宗]. In comparison to historical explanations of interchanging hexagrams， this new diagram of interchanging hexagrams strives to explicate the prior and posterior context of each hexagram and line clearly and more systematically， such that the entire explanatory system is extremely “regular，” enabling the doctrine of interchanging hexagrams that has been the subject of much debate for two-thousand years to be displayed in a linguistic form that is lucid and comprehensible. King Wen’s Square and Round Diagrams of Interchanging Hexagrams [文王卦變方圆图] represent a theoretical breakthrough in relation to historical doctrines of interchanging hexagrams. Another point of innovation in Illuminating Intentionality through the Zhouyi： New Explorations in the Philosophy of the Book of Changes is the philosophical construction of the theory of foundational intentionality （yiben lun 意本论）， which is carried out in each hexagram and line by providing them with a philosophical explanation and new meaning， one which is of course based on the history of interpretations of hexagrams and lines from ancient times to the present. Every book that offers explanations of classical texts has its own inherent value， and waits to be taken up by later readers. The inner vitality of contemporary commentaries and explanations of texts such as the Book of Changes and the Daodejing is dependent on their acceptance and examination in the long river of history. Reflecting on the contemporary situation， the interpretation of classical texts and the construction of systems of rational arguments like those of the West can be said to represent two different orientations for innovation in Chinese philosophy in the present era. Among them， the latter to a great degree strives to provide an answer against the intense background of the afore-mentioned crisis of legitimacy. The common point shared between the two paths however lies in the fact that they both strive to manifest the part of Chinese philosophy that makes it philosophical.
The Entrance of Chinese Philosophy as Comparative Philosophy [11]
Although Chinese philosophy has its own inner problem-consciousness， this is understood differently by different scholars. For example， Li Zehou’s 李泽厚 philosophy is a theory of foundational feeling （qingben lun 情本论）; Sun Xiangchen’s is a theory of foundational family （jiaben lun 家本論）， emphasizing that the original substance of the family has the meaning of production and reproduction; the basic question grasped by Ding Yun’s dao-substance learning is dao， and he sets out from this in his argument and reconstruction. Chen Lai’s 陈来 ontology of benevolent learning （renxue bentilun 仁学本体论） takes the benevolent learning of Confucians throughout history and interprets their aspects of ontological thinking from an ontological dimension， making them become a set of fused doctrines， and can thus be said to use the history of philosophy to reinterpret the content of benevolence （ren 仁）. In his analyses， Chen emphasizes ontological access to the production and reproduction of benevolence： “New Original Benevolence [新原仁] researches deeply into the fundamental meaning of benevolence， and establishes an ontology of benevolence.”
An important question in the entrance of Chinese philosophy as comparative philosophy is how to construct a new Chinese philosophy. The method of construction used by Sun Xiangchen and Ding Yun is problematic construction， bringing out the core problems of Chinese philosophy. When Sun takes family as substance and Ding takes dao as substance， they unfold classic works and provide them with arguments and explanations， “relying on these to assess and assimilate Western learning” at the same time as carrying out their interpretations. Sun emphasizes that “familism” is the core value of the Chinese cultural tradition.” Ding has said that， [I] stress the Book of Changes and the Doctrine of the Mean， while also consulting Daoist texts such as the Zhuangzi. . . . The rational arguments of dao-substance learning can proceed to the mind via inherent nature， and then becomes a school of inherent nature; it can also proceed to inherent nature via the mind and then becomes a school of mind . . . yet the fact that each school can transform perfectly into and interconnect with the other is something that cannot be realized without deep thought. . . . Hence this book acts as an introduction， and as for the relations between the various schools of dao learning and Western learning， it does not attempt to demonstrate these fully through rational arguments， but rather stresses the tradition of problems that each school provides.
He can be said to provide an overall analysis on the Chinese and Western philosophical traditions， holding that if one grasps the great root and source of Chinese philosophy， then after analyzing it clearly， one can use it to assess and assimilate Western philosophy.
A similar approach can be found in Gong Huanan’s 貢华南 Taste Thinking [味觉思想]， which takes taste （wei 味） as the main thread with which to arrange and analyze the history of ancient Chinese thought and develop a set of new explanations. Although Gong has not used taste to interpret Western philosophy， there seems to be no reason why he would be unable to do so if he so wished. Ding Yun fused the two aspects of interpreting Chinese and Western classical texts together， and from this perspective， the subject of dao-substance learning is both analytical and hermeneutic. However， the method of using dao-substance as the core with which to analyze and interpret hides a problem： as soon as the range of texts one covers is rather broad， its power of penetration will appear somewhat limited. For example， in the course of analysis， many classical texts seem to contain the problem of dao-substance， so can be quoted endlessly and indeed with some relevance， yet the work involved in this kind of argument often becomes one of lateral quotation or illustration， and thus further implies the undeniable and incontrovertible approach of demonstrating to Western philosophy that Chinese philosophy is indeed philosophy. Evidently， problematic methods of analysis or construction all face the dilemma of limited penetration.
In comparison， using the method of deep-level interpretation of classical texts and their meanings， the reading method of attempting to pass through past commentaries and explanations and enter into the linguistic context of classical texts， may be able to derive new systems of meaning， as well as possessing deeper penetrative power in terms of the vertical aspect of depth of rational argument. The method of the theory of foundational intentionality places such importance on explaining the meaning of the classics in order to pass through the explanations of classical texts from ancient times to the present， and thereby demonstrate that， apart from Western hermeneutic systems， it is still possible for contemporary scholars to base themselves on Chinese and Western readings of classical texts and strive to derive a systematic set of new explanations. It is for this reason that the theory of foundational intentionality chooses the vertical method and deep-level interpretive work of providing new explanations based on classical texts. Comprehending Dao through Intentions：
An Ideal Context of Consciousness [13]
The referential discussion of methodology above must all be brought together into a single core problem， namely that the way forward for contemporary Chinese philosophy still lies in returning to the most fundamental， original and great philosophical questions. This problem-consciousness itself connects together past and present， Chinese and Western， as in Li Zehou’s regarding feelings as fundamental， Mou Zhongjian and Chen Lai regarding benevolence as fundamental， Huang Yushun regarding life as fundamental， Sun Xiangchen regarding family as fundamental， Gong Huanan regarding taste as fundamental， and Lin An-wu and Ding Yun regarding dao as substance. If one profoundly faces fundamental philosophical questions and strives to give new readings based on classical texts， one may discover that one’s present physical body is merely something to be made use of， that ontological thinking concerning dao， production， and the like speaks through “me，” and that “my” intentions can be put into action through texts. As long as one condenses the intention of dao into one’s writings and works， other assessments and appraisals concerned with dao are no longer important. This consciousness of thinking philosophically is a personal experience of dao， one that in the philosophy of intentionality is called dao-intentionality （daoyi 道意）， that is， a state of unity between dao and an intention interpreted by means of language that is realized after undergoing a personal experience. The process of intentional comprehension refers directly to classical texts themselves， to a mutual resonance and affectivity between individuals and classical texts that transcend time and space， the things thus affected being then expressed through philosophical language， and thereby a meaningful manifestation of the great dao in the time and space of the present. Although traditional doctrines generally regarded dao as fundamental， as Laozi noted， “Since I do not know its name， I simply call it dao”—the intention of the theory of foundational intentionality， like dao， is simply a convenient means of expression.
The core ontological state of Chinese philosophy， in which substance （ti 体） and function （yong 用） are as one and not divided， implies that it cannot be grasped using a Western ontological dualism or doctrine of external transcendence based on God. What must be clearly stated is that Chinese philosophy is not like the either/or opposition between dualism and monism in Western philosophy. Chinese philosophy has very strong internal tensions within a form of immanent monism. How then should one face the original state of existence or being？ In Chinese philosophy， a problem like the body–mind relation more often manifests as the body and mind as one， using the mind to control the body. For example， the philosophy of intentionality emphasizes using thoughts to control and reflect on the changes of the mind and body， taking up the inner observation discussed in the Inner Canons of the Yellow Emperor [黃帝内经] and the Kinship of the Three in Accordance with the Book of Changes [周易参同契]， in which， when inner observation is mastered， the body seems to transform from a microcosm to a macrocosm. The state of the body becomes ever more closely correlated with both the sun and moon and with time and space， a kind of perceptual inner observation that is an observation of the greater dao. Consciousness in this state exists and can be utilized， the consciousness of the mind attaining a regulated state in which subject and object are fused and body and mind are interconnected as a unified whole， and hence this is also an intentional observation. The core concept emphasized by the philosophy of intentionality is intention. Intention is not the pure externality or object referred to in phenomenology， but rather simultaneously produces the two dimensions of intentionality and meaning： thoughts always have their external relations in their originary context， and only in such an originary and situational state can consciousness possess its power of existence and contextuality; it is also precisely in relation to such a state that the contextuality of consciousness can be produced. Thus in relation to Wang Yangming’s 王陽明 （1472–1528） view that “that which is produced by the mind is intention” and Liu Zongzhou’s 刘宗周 （1578–1645） view that “intentions are preserved by the mind， and not produced by the mind，” the philosophy of intentionality stresses Liu Zongzhou’s meaning.
The theory of foundational intentionality holds that， in terms of ontology， intentions are more important than dao， while in terms of epistemology， intentions are more important than the mind. If the consciousness of the mind’s inner observation has not yet attained a state of reflexivity， one will be unable to realize the mind’s state of production and reproduction without cease. As a form of existence that is capable of producing and bestowing activity， following the production and reproduction of the mind and cosmos， the power of intention responds to and unifies with the productive power of nature， and in such resonance between intentions and the living cosmos， intention realizes itself as a special kind of relation between mind and things.
Before intentionality is understood and experienced， there is a pre-conscious state or state of pre-consciousness; after intentionality is manifested or concretized， one can speak of consciousness or thought. The existence of consciousness or thought is inseparable from its inner productive power or force， as well as from its external context， since the existential state of intention is inseparable from the context in which mind and things are interconnected. Of course， since such a context is inseparable from the contextuality of the world， so consciousness is in fact being and yet non-being. In other words， “intentionality” can be cultivated in a broad and vast context. If intentions are only based on immediate things， then consciousness merely remains in a situational state that is immediately produced; however， if intentions are based on the world as a whole， even though the context of intentions is still contingent and temporary， it can attain a holistic and transcendent state， one in which human intention comprehends the intentions of Heaven， in which individual consciousness is transcended through a unity of Heaven and humanity （tian ren heyi 天人合一）. When the Daodejing speaks of “embracing the One” （baoyi 抱一）， when the Book of Changes speaks of “unifying one’s virtue with Heaven and Earth，” and when the Doctrine of the Mean speaks of “forming a trinity with Heaven and Earth，” they all express this kind of ideal situation of consciousness in which human intentionality is unified with the intentionality of Heaven and Earth， an intentionality of Heaven and humanity that transcends immediate everyday life. In conclusion， both the “intentionality of Heaven and humanity” of Illuminating Intentionality through the Zhouyi： New Explorations in the Philosophy of the Book of Changes and the “intentionality of nature” of Illuminating the Daodejing and Its Intentionality represent the Chinese philosophical sensibility， and are the most central meaning of dao in the Chinese philosophical classics. If one lacks a personal experience that interconnects the dao of Heaven with human affairs （the dao-substance）， it can be difficult to bring forth the expressions and arguments of Chinese philosophy from ancient times to the present. Although this Chinese philosophical sensibility in which dao-substance implies an intentionality of Heaven and humanity can seem immanent， it in fact unifies immanence and transcendence， and thus is capable of transcending immediate existence. Research on Chinese philosophy today needs to understand and express this Chinese philosophical sensibility， making it “able to be spoken” （Daodejing， chap. 1） and formed into the written word， making the intentionality of nature exist as eternally as the intentionality of nature itself. The significance of the philosophy of intentionality based on the theory of foundational intentionality lies in its exploration of the Chinese philosophical sensibility as the eternal truth of Chinese classical texts， enabling its inner charm to transcend space and time like the classics themselves， being passed down from generation to generation， such that the inexhaustible intentionality of the great dao between Heaven and Earth is carried and continued by the illuminated intentionality of the classics.
Translated by Benjamin M. Coles