论文部分内容阅读
“旋转门”现象发生前,跳槽审计师与客户公司的潜在雇佣关系会降低审计师的独立性,加剧上市公司的费用粘性。本文以2001年至2014年我国沪深A股上市公司为样本,实证研究审计师与客户公司的潜在雇佣关系对上市公司费用粘性的影响。结果表明“旋转门”现象发生前,跳槽审计师审计未来雇主时,潜在雇佣关系会损害审计师的独立性,不利于降低代理问题引起的费用粘性;在区分大事务所(国际四大或国内八大)和小事务所(非国际四大且非国内八大)样本后,发现当跳槽审计师来自小事务所时,其独立性较差,更不利于降低代理问题引起的费用粘性。
Prior to the phenomenon of “revolving door,” the potential employment relationship between auditors and client companies would reduce the auditor’s independence and aggravate the cost stickiness of listed companies. This paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2001 to 2014 as a sample to empirically study the impact of the potential employment relationship between auditors and client companies on the cost stickiness of listed companies. The results show that before the “revolving door” phenomenon occurs, the potential employment relationship may impair the auditor’s independence when auditing the future employer, and it is not conducive to reducing the cost stickiness caused by the agency problem. Or domestic eight) and small firms (non-international big four and non-domestic eight samples), found that when the job-hopping auditors come from small firms, their independence is poor, but also not conducive to reducing the cost of agency caused by stickiness.