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休谟在《人类理解研究》第十章“论神迹”中,提出了一个反驳神迹的重要原则:“衡量证据”原则,他认为一个神迹只有在存在一组对它有利的证据时才能被建立。通过利用概率统计学上的贝叶斯定理,休谟关于神迹的论证能得到重新解释。无论是对单一神迹的单独证明,还是对众多神迹的联合证明,借助贝叶斯定理都可以得到清楚明白的说明。原则上不管是单一神迹还是众多神迹中至少一个发生的可能性,经过个别证据的累积都可以达到一个高的概率。在给定条件下,对于信仰上帝的人们而言,关于神迹的证据可以为上帝的存在提供有力的支持,但是假如人们不准备做一个信仰者,那么即使他拥有这么多关于神迹的证据,他也仍然没有理由去相信上帝存在。
In his tenth chapter on the study of human understanding, Hume proposed an important principle for refuting miracles: the principle of “measuring evidence,” and he believes that a miracle can only be beneficial if there is a group The evidence can only be established. Hume’s argument on miracles can be reinterpreted by using the Bayesian theorem of probability statistics. Whether it is a separate proof of a single miracle, or a joint proof of numerous miracles, the clear explanation can be obtained by Bayes’ theorem. In principle, the possibility of at least one of a single miracle and numerous miracles can be achieved with a high probability of accumulating through individual evidence. Under certain conditions, evidence of miracles can provide strong support for the existence of God for those who believe in God, but if one is not prepared to be a believer, even if he has so much evidence of miracles He still has no reason to believe in God.